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This essay attempts to use the philosophy of politics
and history of George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel to interpret a
contemporary situation--the Vietnam War.

The gradual involve-

ment of America in Vietnam is illustrated by the use of Hegel's
dialectic or logic.

Internal problems and strife are put in

perspective by Hegel's political philosophy.
Problems arise because general theories must always
ignore particulars in a concrete situation such as Vietnam.
But Hegel's view of the world is generally applicable to the
twentieth century.
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I hope I shall succeed in earning and gaining your
confidence.

To begin with, however, I may not claim any-

thing except that you should bring along confidence in
science and confidence in yourselves.

The courage for

truth, the faith in the power of the spirit, is the first
condition of philosophy.

Man, since he is spirit, may and

should deem himself worthy of the highest; of the greatness
and power of his spirit he cannot think grandly enough.
And with this faith, nothing will be so coy or hard that
will not open up for him.

The initially concealed and

locked up essence of the universe has no strength to
resist the courage to know; it must uncover its wealth
and its depths before the eyes of such courage and let
it enjoy them.
Hegel
Lecture, University of Heidelberg
October 28, 1816

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Hegel--philosopher, political theorist, historian-has contributed much to Western thought.

Hegel's Idealism

provided a basis for Marx's dialectical materialism.

He is

the father of the British Idealism of MacTaggert, T. H. Green,
and Thomas Carlyle, 1 and of American Idealism as represented
by Josiah Royce and William T. Harris. 2

Even those who

violently denounce Hegel and his philosophy are deeply
indebted to him.

The pragmatists, William James and John

Dewey, based much of their philosophy on a rejection of
Hegelian absolutism.3

Several recent scholars such as

1 T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political
Obligation (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1895); J.E.
MacTaggert, Studies in the He~elian Dialectic (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1 96); Thomas Carlyle, Heroes,
Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (New York: J. W.
Lovell Company, 1895).
2Josiah Royce, "The Concept of the Absolute and the
Dialectical Method, 11 and "Self-Consciousness, Social
Consciousness and Nature,:, in The Basic Writings of Josiah
Royce, 2 vols., John J. McDermott, ed. (Chicago, London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), I; William T. Harris,
"Introduction to Hegel's Philosophic Method," Journal of
Speculative Philosophy (1869), pp. 1-16.
3william James, A Pluralistic Universe (New York:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1909); John Dewey, German Philosophy
and Politics (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1915),

1

2

Karl Popper and Sidney Hook 4 have attacked Hegel; in recent
years others have refuted these attacks by attempting a
new interpretation of Hegel.5
Hegel can offer much to the contemporary historian.
A philosophy of history can offer a perspective of history
and a sense of continuity between the ages.

There is much

of Hegel's work that is not of immediate interest to the
historian i.e., his logic, but there are other aspects
of Hegel's writings that are of interest.

As Newton and

the scientists of the Enlightenment sought to fine order
in nature, Hegel sought to find order in the mind of man-history was the stage for the development of man's reason.
He attempted to bridge the gap between the Enlightenment
and the nineteenth century revolt against reason.

Hegel

did not deny man's natural instincts but believed that
these should be refined by man's mind and used in a rational
way.

To Hegel there was irrationality in the world but

this irrationality was only superficial; if one looked

4Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies
(Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1963),
pp. 199-273, Hereafter cited as Popper, The Open Society;
Sidney Hook, "Hegel Rehabilitated," and "Hegel and his
Apologists," in Hegel's Political Philosophy, Walter
Kaufmann, ed., (New York: Atherton Press, 1963). Hereafter cited as Kaufmann, ed., Political Philosophy.
5 Shlomo Avineri, "The Problem of War in Hegel's
Thought," Journal of the History of Ideas XXII (Oct. Dec. 1961), 463-474. Hereafter cited as Avineri, "The
Problem of War."
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underneath the chaos, one would find a reasonable process.
Sometimes philosophies of history are looked upon as useless
flights of fancy.

They are sometimes viewed as being too

general to apply to contemporary problems.

Is it possible

for a man of insight to look into the historical process
and derive historical laws as Newton looked into the world
of nature and formulated laws of motion?
The purpose of this essay is to discover if Hegel's
interpretation can be applied to Vietnam.

But the reader

should be warned that there will be instances when Hegel's
views will not be compatible with twentieth century historical
views.

For example the Orient is treated in a more under-

standing way by contemporary historians than by the
historians of Hegel's day.

The importance of geography in

the determination of national characteristics is not
viewed with high regard by many experts today.

In Hegel's

time geographical determinism was widely accepted.

In

spite of these deficiencies, Hegel's philosophy can provide
perspective and insight into a time which seems chaotic
and without reason.

The Vietnam War provides a series of

events to apply Hegel's philosophy as Vietnam provides
examples of external conflict abroad and internal conflict
in America.

Hegel found such conditions present in the

decline of great empires.
Hegel did not extend his views to Vietnam so this
author has extrapolated his views on China i.e., the

4
Orient to include Vietnam.

America was only touched briefly

in his Philosophy of History so it has been necessary to
extend Hegel's views on America beyond the nineteenth
century.

The basis for this extrapolation is the development

of other world historical peoples that Hegel observed.

CHAPTER II
HEGEL
George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was one of the world's
great synthesizer for he attempted to find meaning in the
world; he followed in the tradition of St. Augustine, Thomas
Aquinas, Kant, Fichte and Schelling.

Although this tradition

has almost died out in the western philosophical world, there
have been a few large scale attempts to put the world in order.
In this century scientists are contributing the most to the
tradition of Idealism.

Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, and others

of this order have carried their work beyond perception and
sense-certainty to understanding.

Their works have not been

carried into politics or economics because these scientific
concepts are beyond the grasp of most people or, in some cases,
may not be applicable to the social order.
Hegel wrote many of his works in an age of political upheaval.

This disruptive state of affairs gave little security

to the academic community and Hegel more than once had to leave
a position because of the closure of a university.

It is

interesting to note that Hegel wrote his most daring and creative
works before he received his appointment to the Chair of Philosophy
at the University of Berlin.

The Phenomenology of Mind was

nearing completion when Napoleon took over Jena in October of
1806; this volume contained most of the elements of Hegel's
later works--the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of History.

5
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The Phenomenology is a curious work:

paragraph follows

paragraph of ponderous prose only to be interruped by aphorisms
that reflect Hegel's understanding of mind and history.

But

it does illustrate Hegel's view of the development of man's
mind from a state of nature to a state of consciousness of
reason.

It is a companion volume to the development of Hegel's

philosophy of history.

"Reason is spirit, when the certainty

of being all reality has been raised to the level of truth, and
reason is consciously aware of itself as its own world, and of
the world as itself. 116

The consciousness of reason or spirit

was the highest form in the development of man's mind.
Reason had two forms for Hegel--knowledge and science,
and rational action and practice.
govern action and practice.

Knowledge and science should

In history, as in individual cases,

Hegel assumed that men were capable of making rational decisions.
Hegel was very careful to specify what processes the mind had
to evolve through in order to be rational.

He was extremely

skeptical of common sense.
This 'healthy common sense', which takes it to be the
solid substantial type of conscious life, is in its
process of perception, merely the sport of these abstractions; it is always poorest when it means to be richest.
In that it is tossed about by these unreal entities,
bandied from one to the other, and by its sophistry endeavors to affirm and hold fast alternately now one, then

6 aeorge Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of
Mind, trans, J.B. Baille (London:
G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd.,
'f§'1;1f), p. 457. Hereafter cited as Hegel, Phenomenology.

7
the exact opposite, it sets itself against the truth and
imagines philosophy has merely to do with 'things of th
intellect' (Gedankendinge), merely manipulates 'ideas'.

7

The development of common sense or consciousness into
understanding or spirit is beyond the scope of this investigation.
Hegel saw that the common sense approach to many things could
be only a primitive way of viewing situations.

The senses of

man which have their fusion in common sense cannot be completely
trusted. 8

It was for these reasons that Hegel was frequently

skeptical of the attitudes of the common man.

The average man

used his natural instincts to tell him what was right in situations that demanded much more than basic instincts.

In the

realm of the mind or the development of history, these common
sense perceptions were not enough to enable the average citizen
to react correctly.

This attitude probably accounts for Hegel's

acceptance of monarchy as the ideal form of government for his
age.

He was afraid that democracy would decay into anarchy.

However Hegel's observations were confined to the limited
democracies of the Greek states.
In the Phenomenology Hegel distinguished between internal
freedom and external freedom.

Internal freedom was the type of

7Hegel, Phenomenology, pp. 176-177.
8 An internal sense which was regarded as the common
bond or centre of the five senses. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (1963), p. 351.

8
freedom which could be realized only by thinking; regardless
of his material conditions, man was free to think as he wanted.
In thinking, I am free, because I am not in another, but
remain simply and solidly in touch with myself; and the
object . . . is in individual unity my being-for-myself;
and my procedure in comprehending is a procedure within
myself.9
This was the doctrine of the Romantic movement in Europe,
the emphasis upon the individual and his right to determine
his own views.

There was much more to Hegel's freedom than

this subjective self-determination of freedom for the individual.
Subjective freedom was a false form of freedom, a form of bondage.
Only when the individual gave up the "I" for the !!We!! did he
truly find his fulfillment in the life of the nation.

Herbert

Marcuse observed that Hegel's state could not provide perfect
truth or perfect freedom but it could provide political emancipation.

Perfect freedom and truth could only be found in art,

religion, and philosophy or the realm of the mind.lo
The Phenomenology illustrates the development of Hegel's
own thought.

It gives some insight into Hegel's mind while he

was still a relatively young man of thirty seven.

It provides

a logical framework for an understanding of his Philosophy of
Right.

This volume is the only one of Hegel's works that

9Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 243.
10 Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the
Rise of Social Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 91,
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explicitly states his political views.

Hegel's detractors

use this volume when they want evidence to attack him.
Blanket quotations strung together from several pages are
frequent tools of his opposition.

Karl Popper, in the Open

Society, has used this method to condemn Hegel for his "totalitarian" views. 11

Walter Kaufmann has taken Popper to task for

his exercise of criticism.

"Popper writes like a district

attorney who wants to persuade his audience that Hegel was
against God, freedom, and equality--and used quilt quotations
to convince us. 11 12
What is there in Hegel's writing that allow men to form
this bias?

Even in the nineteenth century there were groups

known as left Hegelians and right Hegelians; from the left
Hegelians came Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx.
division appears today.

The same

A principle of the dialectic--the

positing of opposites--gives the user whatever fuel he needs
to back his own views.

If he is opposed to Hegelian ideas, he

can take the side of the dialectic which could be called
conservative.

If he has some sympathy for Hegel, he \/\lill use

the side of the dialectic which advocates more liberal ideas.
For example, Hegel found both good and bad elements in war.

11 Popper, The Open Society, pp. 199-273.
12 Walter Kaufmann, "The Hegel Myth and Its Method," in
Kaufmann, ed., Political Philosophy, p. 142.

10
The ethical moment in war is implied in what has been
said in this Paragraph. War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external accident, . .
War
has the higher significance that by its agency, as I have
remarked elsewhere, 'the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite
institutions; . . . ,13 Hence in war, war itself is characterized as something which ought to pass away.
It implies
therefore the provisio of th~ jus ~entium that the possibility
of peace by retained.
. , 14
If one wishes to use Hegel to back a particular view, then one
is quite likely to find a quotation.
The use of the dialectic was not invented by Hegel; it
was used by Plato in his Dialogues and also by Kant, Hegel's
predecessor.

The dialectic is not the efficient system of

thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis that many Hegelians use; it is a
far more subtle system of development.

It is a process of

evolution of thought rather than a revolution of thought.

In

the introduction of Hegel's Early Theological Writings, Richard
Kroner notes:
This new Logic is of necessity as dialectical as the movement of thinking itself . . . . But it is by no means the
mere application of a monotonous trick that could be learned
and repeated.
It is not the mere imposition of an ever recurring pattern.
It may appear so in the mind of some historians who catalogue the living trend of thought, but in
reality it is ever changing, ever growing development; Hegel
is nowhere pedantic in pressing concepts into a ready-made
mold.
The theme of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, like
the motif of a musical composition, has many modulations and

13 George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right,
trans. by T. M. Knox (London:
Oxford, University Press, 1967),
pp. 209-210. Hereafter cited as Hegel, Philosophy of Right.
14 Ibid., p. 215.
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modifications.
It is never applied; it is itself only a
poor and not even helpful i~straction of what is really
going on in Hegel's Logic.
Gustav Mueller has investigated this misuse of Hegel's
logic.

Mueller believed that the legend of thesis, antithesis,

synthesis was spread by Karl Marx who distorted Hegel.

"It

is Marxism superimposed on Hegel." 16
Hegel's own view of the system is summed up in a critique
of Kant's concept of the dialectic.

Hegel seemed to feel that

Kant made only abstract thought out of this development of
thought.
It betrays a great instinct for the Notion when Kant says
that the first category is positive, the second the negative
of the first, the third the synthesis of the two. The
triplicity, this ancient form of the Pythagoreans, NeoPlatonists and the Christian religion, although it here
reappears as a quite external schema ~~ly, conceals within
itself the absolute form, the Notion.
The reader who searches Hegel's works for evidence of this
trilogy will not find it unless he imposes it himself.

To expect

the dialectic to be a dramatic revelation is burdening it with
a very heavy load.

In view of the abstractness of Hegel's logic,

1 5aeorge Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, On Christianity: Early
Theological Writings, trans. by T. M. Knox (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1948), p. 32. Hereafter cited as Hegel, Ch~istianity.
16 austav E. Mueller, "The Hegel Legend," Journal of the
History of Ideas, XIX (1958), p. 413.
1 7aeorge Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, History of Philosophy,
3 vols., trans. by E. S. Haldane and Frances Simson (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), III, 439,

12

it might be most beneficial to present the dialectic as a
process of growth or development.

Hegel frequently described

the dialectic as one would an organic concept in nature.

Time

is a seed which contains all the possibilities for future development.

As time progresses this plant, i.e., history, develops

its capabilities.

The later stages envelope the earlier stages

much as the fruit envelops the flower; the early stages are
particular moments within later development.

Even though the

state transcends the family and civil society, the earlier stages
are important within the state.

"

. it assumes successive

forms which it successively transcends; and by this very process
of transcending its earlier stages, gains an affirmative, and,
in fact, a richer and more concrete shape;

.

1118

11

this dialectic is not an activity of subjective thinking applied
to some matter externally, but is rather the matter's very soul
putting forth its branches and fruit organicallj~ 19
The basic unit of Hegel's political philosophy is the state.
The state is the mind objectified; the state is the highest of
all human institutions, but it is subordinate to the absolute
mind.

In the state the individual finds his true freedom, i.e.,

his rights and duties.

Other elements of life are combined in

18 George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy bf H~story,
trans. by J. Sibree (New York:
The Colonial Press, 1899), p. 63.
Hereafter cited as Hegel, Philosophy of History.
l9Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp. 34-35.
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state, the mind of nature or the family and its division
and appearance or civil society.

The family is important

to the state because it is the subjective appearance of
morality.

The family may be regarded as a single person for

its members have surrendered their individual personalities
as parents or have not attained independent personality as
children.

The spirit of the family is as important as the

spirit of a people in a state; the feeling in both cases
consists of a feeling of consciousness and will embracing
common interests of the members generally.
present in the family is feeling.

The unity that is

It is natural that the state

should respect family feelings because it is here that the
state obtains beings that have the ability to feel as a whole
or unit.

In the Vietnam world this feeling of unity with its

basis in the family was important in the development of nationalism.

As the family expands into the external world, it be-

comes a nation or a people with a common origin.

It is then

necessary to set up a civil society; the association of these
peoples is brought about by the need for a legal system to
obtain peace and security, and for an external organization
for attaining their particular and common interests.
There are several duties of a civil society; one of the
most interesting duties that Hegel deals with is that of
education.

The importance of man's mind in society is evident

from Hegel's statement.

14
The idea that the state of nature is one of innocence and
that there is a simplicity of manners in uncivilized peoples,
implies treating education as something purely external,
the ally of corruption. Similarly, the feeling that needs,
their satisfaction, the pleasures and comforts of private
life, and so forth, are absolute ends, implies treating
education as a mere means to these ends. Both these views
display lack of aquaintance with the nature of mind and the
end of reason. . .
The final purpose of education therefo:e, is liber~bion and the struggle for a higher liberation
still; . . . .
Education had the duty of lifting or liberating man from
his natural restrictions in the family.

Hegel mirrored the

liberalism of the Enlightenment in his admiration of education.
If stumbling blocks could be removed from society, man could
progress; Hegel believed that education would remove these
impediments.
The third and final state of ethical society was the
welding i.e., dialectical process into unity of the family and
civil society in the constitution.

The constitution became the

organization of the state and the self-related process of organic
life.

It is in the development of the constitution and the rights

of the state over the individual that Hegel is frequently accused
of being an arch-conservative.

Hegel admitted that the state

involved imperious lordship on one hand and instinctive submission on the other, but that there is some degree of voluntary
connection.

In the constitution itself one could see the self-

development of the rational or political conditions of the people;

20 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 124.
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it is in this organic development that the will of the people
is represented.

Hegel realized that the obedience demanded

in a constitution between those who command and those who obey
might seem inconsistent with liberty.

He conceded that a

constitution should be so framed that citizens obey as little
as possible and the smallest amount of command be left to
superiors.

The substance for which subordination is possible

should be decided on and resolved by the will of the citizens.
The imposition of a constitution that was not the outgrowth of
the will of the people created many problems in the Vietnam
world.

During Hegel's time when empires were being broken up

and put back together, there were opinions coming from all
branches of society about constitutions.

It evidently influen-

ced Hegel for he made numerous comments about the situation.
In our day there has come before the public an endless
amount of babble about the constitution as about reason
itself, and the stalest babble of all has been produced
in Germany . .
It is no wonder that this babble has
made reasonable men just as sick of the words 'reason',
'enlightenment', 'right', &c. as of the words 'constitution'
and 'freedom', and a man might well be ashamed now to go on
discussing the constitution of the state at all?
. . . we
may also hope that those who hold that the divine is inconceivable and the knowledge of truth a wild-goose chase will
feel themselves bound to refrain from taking part in the
discussion.21
Hegel attacked both conservative and liberal positions:
the divine power of the monarch was not truth and was no longer

21 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp. 174-175.
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a tenable position.

Those who followed the tradition of the

Enlightenment were using words for their own ends.

It was

almost a plea for calm in a time of turmoil; it is a view
which might be applicable in the twentieth century.
Hegel divided his state into three divisions, the legislative, the executive, and the crown.

The legislative branch had

the power to determine and establish the universal; the executive
had the power to decide particular cases under the universal;
the crown had the power of ultimate decision for the different
powers were bound in this one individual unity. 22

The monarch

was a man of nature who was ideally above the pursuits of
common men; he had a true vision of what was good for the
country.

Again Hegel visualized a world as it should be and

ignored the world of reality.
There are many other concepts in Hegel's political philosophy that might be discussed.

Public opinion, patriotism,

freedom of the press and of the spoken word are dealt with.
They are more realistically discussed in the light of internal
problems in America today.

To repeat these concepts would be

needless; it is sufficient to say that Hegel dealt with these
civil liberties in a more liberal manner than his detractors
gave him credit for.

The rights of the individual within the

state, and the good and bad aspects of war are dealt within

22 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 176.

17
the Hegelian dialectic i.e., both sides of the problem are
presented and allowed to develop.
view and a wrong view:

Hegel does not have a right

he simply states that it is not up to

mortal men to decide what is right--that is the duty of posterity.

. its right is the highest right of all--over

these finite minds in the history of the world which is the
world's court of judgement. 112 3
Much of the emphasis on Hegel's political conservatism
has been a result of misinterpretation, mistranslation, and
the addition of students' notes to original manuscripts.
Kaufmann noted one sentence that has caused much controversy.
Kaufmann translated the sentence as, "It is the way of God
with the world that there should be the state."

One of Hegel's

interpreters, Lowenberg, has translated the same sentence as,
"The state is the march of God through the world."

T. M. Knox

translated it as, "The march of God in the world, that is what
the state is."

Hook echoed this last translation.

A reader

could be misled by any of these translations; it appeared that
Lowenberg and Knox have rendered a more conservative translation
than did Kaufmann. 24

This author has favored the use of Kaufmann's

translation of this sentence for it seems more in the spirit of
the rest of Hegel's work.

23 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 216.
24

walter Kaufmann, "Introduction," in Kaufmann, ed.,
Political Philosophy, pp. 3-4.

18
A second problem is the addition of students' notes to
original manuscripts.

Students published lecture notes on

the philosophy of history, the philosophy of art, the philosophy of religion, and the history of philosophy from their
lecture notes.

Few professors would care to reach posterity

through their students' notes; Hegel changed his notes every
time he gave the lectures so there would be even more inconsistency between Hegel's and his students' manuscripts. 25
Hegel's Philosophy of History, the focus of concern of
this essay, is the record of time unfolding itself as the
development of man's freedom.

The only hypothesis in this

volume is that the history of the world is a reasonable process.
"

that reason governs and has governed the world .

• . ."

26

Hegel does not believe that every aspect of history is reasonable
or that history is without unhappiness and sacrifice.

There are

many examples throughout this work that illustrates Hegel 1 s
concept of the tragic element in history.
World is not the theatre of happiness.

"The History of the

Periods of happiness

are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony .
"But so mighty a form must trample down many an innocent flower

. . . . . 1128

Nations as well as individuals may be very unhappy

25 walter Kaufmann, Hegel (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday
and Co., 1965), p. 107. Hereafter cited as Kaufmann, Hegel.
26 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 121.
2 7Ibid., pp. 26-27.
28 Ibid., p. 32.

19
in their lives.

Happiness is only a feeling and not a

process of reason.

This is not necessarily a bad feature for

unhappiness may be a driving factor in any accomplishment.
The 'cunning of reason' has caused many individuals to suffer.
This was the only explanation Hegel could give for historical
processes that did not seem reasonable.
not happy individuals.

Hegel's great men are

"If we go on to cast a look at the fate

of these World-Historical persons, whose vocation it was to be
agents of the World-Spirit--we shall find it to have been no
happy one.

They attained no calm enjoyment; their whole life

was labor and trouble; their whole nature was nought else but
their master-passion. 112 9

In spite of this acceptance of the

tragic, Hegel attempted to emphasize the goals of history
rather than the sacrifices.
What was there in Hegel's life that made him so aware of
the tragic elements in life?

Human misery was obvious to

Hegel for his mother died when he was thirteen years old.

His

only brother was killed in the Napoleonic Wars, and his best
friend, the poet Holderlin, went insane while still a young
man.

Hegel's only sister was despondent most of her life and

eventually committed suicide. 30
was much uncertainty.

In Hegel's personal life there

He spent several years tutoring children

2 9Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 31,

3 °Kaufmann, Hegel, p. 257.
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of wealthy families and in being master of a gymnasium.

He

was competent at these tasks but did not feel as though he
had arrived at his life's work.

Only in middle age did Hegel

obtain a position as professor.

Walter Kaufmann seems to feel

that Hegel needed his philosophy in order to cope with the
misery of human life.
The young Hegel was not a professor who, sitting at his
desk, felt confident that he was omniscent, though this is,
more or less, the popular image of the man.
In fact, he
was at odds with himself, desperately needed the therapy
of philosophy, but for many years did not succeed in mastering it sufficiently to cure himself.3 1
The preface to Hegel's Philosophy df History elaborates
many of the concepts found in the Phenomenology; in addition
he added some ideas that would be useful only in history.

The

great man concept and the influence of geography on history
are two of these ideas.

World historical individuals were men

whose aims lay in the principle of the creating idea or truth
striving towards consciousness of itself.

They were men who

had no idea of what was unfolding, but sensed the spirit of
the times and carried out this spirit in action.
They are men, therefore, who appear to draw the impulse
of their life from themselves; and whose deeds have produced
a condition of things and a complex of historical rela§~ons
which appear to be only their interest and their work.

3 1 Kaufmann, Hegel, p. 107.
3 2 Hegel, Philbsophy of History, p. 30.
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Their individual passions were the driving force for great
historical accomplishments such as those of Caesar, Alexander,
and Napoleon.

"This special interest of passion is thus in-

separable from the active development of a general principle;
for it is from the special and determinate and from its negative
that the Universal results. 1133
apart from the individual.

General development was a thing

Hegel seemed to feel that the 'cunn-

ing of reason' stirred these passions in man, exposed him to
danger, and let him pay the price for his error.

The general

principle of reason was much more important than the particular
element of human passions.
at any time for the general.

The particular may be sacrificed
The natural passions of man had

a purpose in that they might fulfill the purposes of Universal
history; to many this sounds as though the 'might makes right'
principle is the driving force of history.

If the individual

has the power, then he has the right to do as he likes.

Hegel

was careful to qualify his statements and equate power with
reason .
. man is an object of existence in himself only in
virtue of the Divine that is in him--that which was designed
at the outset as Reason; which, in view of its activity and
power of self-determination, was called Freedom . . . . This
is the seal of the absolute and sublime destiny of man--that
he knows what is good and what is evil; that his Destiny is
his very ability to will either good or bad . . . . The brute
alone is simply innocent.3

33Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 32.
34 Ibid., p. 34.

22

Hegel felt that the divine aspect of his man was his
ability to reason and to know the difference between good and
evil.

Since man knew the difference between right and wrong,

he could improve himself and become more godlike.

The world

historical individual who crushed people in his path knew that
he was morally wrong, but he would be judged as right in the
eyes of posterity if his aims were part of the general aim of
reason.

This was the judgement that would be bestowed on the

present by world history according to Hegel.
Geography was important to Hegel's view of history for it
was one of the conditions that helped to determined the spirit
of the people in a country.

The intellectual traditions of

Hegel's time emphasized the importance of geography in determining the character of a people so Hegel did not tread any new
paths.

But geographical factors were not the sole factor for

Hegel noted, " . . . the mild Ionic sky certainly contributed
much to the charm of the Homeric poems, yet this alone can
produce no Homers. 1135

The natural setting was important for

Hegel believed that the frigid and torrid zones have not yet
produced a world historical people.

Nature was too strong in

these regions to permit the spirit to develop strongly.

A

suitable environment was necessary for the Hegelian concept of

35Hegel, Philosophy of History, p.

Bo.
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freedom to develop just as a seed needed fertile soil and water
for it to sprout.

Hegel offered an explanation in the language

of the dialectic.
We must first take notice of those natural conditions
which have to be excluded once and for all from the drama
of the World's History.
In the Frigid and Torrid zone the
locality of World-Historical peoples cannot be found.
For
awakening consciousness takes its rise surrounded by natural
influences alone, and every development of it is the
reflection of the Spirit back upon itself in opposition to
the immediate, unreflected character of mere notion.
Nature is the first standpoint from which man can gain
freedom within himself, and this liberation must not be
rendered difficult by natural obstructions.36
When Hegel dealt with America, he seemed more deterministic
in his outlook.

America had developed a system of government,

but it was not yet a real Hegelian state.

A real Hegelian state

and government could arise only when there was a distinction
between the classes and a wide range between poverty and wealth.
In America there were no social pressures from an expanding
population and such pressure was not likely to exist for a long
time.

Since there was plenty of free land to the West; discontent

among the poor could be taken care of by immigration to the West.
Hegel noted that this condition did not exist in Europe and
dogmatically concludes:
Had the woods of Germany been in existence, the French
Revolution would not have occurred.
. North America
is still in the condition of having land to begin to cultivate. Only when as in Europe the direct increase of agriculturists is checked, will the inhabitants, instead of pressing

36Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 80.
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outwards to o 9upy the fields, press inwards upon each
other . . . . 3
This was similar to Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier
hypothesis.

Since it preceeded Turner's thesis by seventy

years, it is possible that Turner merely elaborated on Hegei.

38

Hegel did not pursue it as far as Turner, but it does indicate
the extent to which Hegel was willing to carry his geographical
determinism.

In dealing with the Orient, Hegel went so far as

to equate geographical differences and types of government.
The rearing of cattle was the business of the upland, agriculture
and industry were the pursuits of the valley-plain, and civil
freedom with the freedom of the sea. 39

In view of the fact that

Hegel treated history as organic growth, it is not surprising
that he was a geographical determinist.

As mentioned in a pre-

vious section, there is a school of historians who views determinism as the essence of folly.
Hegel's universal history began in the Orient for this was
the land where self-consciousness first arose.

In the Orient

in past history and in the present (Hegel's time) only one was
free:

the first political system that Hegel observed was the

despotism of China.

Hegel became a poet rather than a philosopher

37Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 86.
3 8w. Stull Holt, "Hegel, The Turner Hypothesis, and the
Safety-Valve Theory," Agricultural History, XXII (1948), pp.
175-176.
39Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 121.
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when he talked of the progression of freedom from the East
to the West.
The Sun--the Light--rises in the East. Light . . . exists
at the same time as an individuality in the Sun.
Imagination has often pictured to itself the emtoions of a blind
man suddenly becoming possessed of sight, beholding the
bright glimmering of the dawn, the growing light, the flaming
glory of the ascending Sun. The boundless forgetfulness of
his individuality in this pure splendor, is his first feeling--utter astonishment . . . . The History of the World
travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end
of History.40
It was in the East that the self-consciousness of the
individual first became important.

The Orient was in the child-

hood of history for there was only caprice or childlike desire
roving at will according to Hegel.

Except for the emperor,

there were no subjective freedoms, no feeling of rights and duties
in the state.

The despot was the only one who had subjective

freedom and so was the only one who was free.
deal with Vietnam in his philosophy.

Hegel did not

Since China was the

beginning of history and had the most contact with Vietnam,
Hegel's views on China have been extrapolated to include Vietnam.
Hegel observed that the Chinese state was based on a family
tradition; the paternal government held together the constitution
and the empire.
Hegel's views of China were, of course, based on the knowledge of China available in the nineteenth century.

40 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 103,

Hegel
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followed the legalistic school of thought common at that time
in the interpretation of Chinese law. 41

The spirit of the

constitution was the same as the spirit of the family.

"The

Chinese regard themselves as belonging to their family, and
42
at the same time as children of the State."
In the family
there were no individual personalities; in the state they had
as little independent personality as in the state.

The patri-

archal condition in the Orient was the common state of government.
This paternal care on the part of the emperor, and the
spirit of his subjects--who like children do not advance
beyond the ethical principles of the family circle, and
can gain for themselves no independent and civil freedom-makes the whole an empire, administration and social code,
which is at the same time moral and thoroughly prosaic-that is, a produij§ of the Understanding without free Reason
and Imagination.
Hegel felt that honor had not yet developed in China for
punishment was meted out as for children.

A verbal reproach

was not sufficient; corporal punishment must be used as with
a child.

Hegel also felt that the Chinese had the highest

contempt for the individual; accident in Chinese life was as

41

Daniel Ramsdell, Professor, Central Washington State
College, Ellensburg, Washington, personal communication with the
author at Central Washington State College, June 1, 1971.
42
Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 121.
43 Ibid., p. 123.
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much charged with blame was death from intention.

11

Such is

the fearful state of things in regard to responsibility and
non-responsibility; all subjective freedom and moral concern.
d . 44
men t wi'th an ac t·ion are ignore

No t on 1 y was h onor ou t

season in China but morality was given short treatment.

of

The

Chinese were not moral people in Hegel's view.
With this abandonment is connected the great immorality
of the Chinese. They are notorious for deceiving wherever
they can. Friend deceives friend . .
Their frauds are
most astutely and craftily performed, so that Europeans have
to be painfully cautious in dealing with them. Their consciousness of moral abandonment shows itself also in the
fact that the religion of Fo is so widely diffused; a religion which regards as the Highest and Absolute--as Godpure Nothing; which sets up contempt for indiv~guality, for
personal existence, as the highest perfection.
Not only was morality and honor divorced from Chinese life,
but there was little of the element of spirit present i.e., the
consciousness of reason.

Because of this lack of spirit, Hegel

believed that all the Chinese could do was imitate the Europeans.
Art, religion, science, elements that should be of the spirit
were lacking in spirit.

Consciousness had not progressed far

enough in the Chinese people for them to develop their subjective
freedom.

This was a subjective view of Chinese life.

Hegel did

not footnote his sources; his admiration for cultures other than
the traditional sources of European thought is not overwhelming.

44 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 130.
45 Ibid., p. 131.
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Hegel viewed Africa in much the same light as he did the Orient
except that he denied that any were free in Africa.

One has

doubt in some instances whether Hegel considered China to be
the true beginning of consciousness of freedom; he may have
regarded the Orient as the only place where he could begin to
equate the progress of freedom with the advance of the sun.
Hegel thought that he had found a pattern in the evolution
of history.

As the consciousness of freedom traveled across

Asia it became more developed in each country in which it found
a home.

The last of the Oriental world nations to have any

consciousness of freedom was the Persian Empire.

The Persian

Empire was the first of the world historical peoples for Persia
was the first empire that passed into oblivion.

China and India

were still in existence and so could not be called historical.
The Persian Empire comprised Persia, Syria and Semitic Western
Asia, Judea, and Egypt.

It was by contact with this empire that

the first of the western world historical peoples, the Greeks,
arose.

The Greek world was a world for which Hegel had deep

sympathy.

The tradition of the Enlightenment with its emphasis

on classical history is evident in Hegel's treatment of the Greek
world for he mentions that he based his interpretation on his
reading of Herodotus and Thucydides.

Hegel thought that he had

found a pattern to history in the Greek, Roman, and German
worlds; there was more than just the development of the
consciousness of freedom.
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The history of a world historical people could be divided
into three periods:

the first period was the growth of real

individuality in the region and formation into the state.

The

second period was a period of prosperity and independence; this
time also engendered conquests abroad and brought the nation
into contact with the preceeding world,historical people.

There

was victory and much excitement in this second period due to
external conquests; there was dissension internally once the
external excitement died down, for the state had not been faithful to its principles at home.

"In Art and Science, too, this

shows itself in the separation of the Ideal from the Real.
is the point of decline. 1146

Here

The third period, the time of de-

cline and fall, came from contact with a nation that embodied
a higher spirit.
equation.

There is an element of the Universal in this

It is general enough to give lessons to other nations.

A state builds itself on certain principles--honor, justice,
equality.

It becomes strong on these principles and seeks to

embody them in an ever widening sphere of influence.

As the

state extends its reach beyond the borders of its own nation,
it must make concessions in order to carry out these forays.
The concessions must come from inside a nation, and they frequently misuse the principles that made the nation strong.

A

second general principle is that wars are the means of contact

4 6Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 224.
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between world historical peoples.

A war can bring glory,

honor, and culture to a growing nation, but it can also degrade
and destroy a nation.

Each epoch and nation contain within it

the seeds of its own destruction just as an individual contains
within him from birth, the certainty of death.
Hegel's Greek world was the youth of history; in this epoch
the soul of man was fresh and his spirit was free.

It was an

age of joy that was expressed in individual gods rather than
abstract quantities such as time, unity, necessity, heaven, as
in China.

Individuals were not bound patriarchally by nature;

individuals "realize a union through some other medium--through
Law and Custom having the sanction of Spirit. 1147

The second

phase in the development of government was produced in the Greek
world--democracy.

A democratic constitution alone was adaptable

to the conditions where the individual was not entirely dependent
on the state.

Justice and the general interests of a nation were

the ideals of a democracy.

Hegel issued some general statements

on democracy as he had observed it for he felt that it was applicable only under certain circumstances.

The democratic consti-

tution was applicable only in countries where the character of
the people was of one type; dissimilar geographic conditions
in a nation would not permit a democracy to function as a nation.
Slaves would be necessary to do the daily work so that citizens

47 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 226.
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would be free to devote themselves to the state.

Hegel also

believed that popular orators frequently decided the policies
of the people; this in turn produced corruption and disorder.
Hegel did not elaborate on the use of slaves in America, but
he did discuss the justice of slavery in the Greek and Roman
states .
. slavery is itself a phase of advance from the merely
isolated sensual existence--a phase of education--a mode of
becoming a participant in a higher morality and the culture
connected with it. Slavery is in and for itself inju~tlce,
for the essence of humanity is Freedom; but for this man
must be matured. The gradual abolition of slavery is ~§erefore wiser and more equitable than its sudden removal.
Slavery had to be dealt with the way any other historical
phenomenon would be treated.

Hegel believed that sudden changes

in the institutions that had developed over a long period of
time would be disastrous for order would be destroyed.

Abolition

of slavery would remove these bonds of injustice, but they must
be removed slowly so that the freedman could be educated for
his new role in society.
Greece became a world historical people after they defeated
the Perisan Empire in the Persian Wars.

The Greek world fell

when the internal conditions of the Greek states were broken
into factions which competed with each other instead of competing
with the next world historical people.

Greece lost her status

as a world historical people to a nation which embodied a higher

48 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 99.
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spirit, Rome.

The Roman world was the manhood of history

for Hegel; here the individual obeyed neither the despot or
his own whim but worked for the individual good--he realized
his own aim only in the general aim.

Hegel viewed some of

these concepts as improvements over the Greek world, but there
were some aspects that were not positive:

much of the geniality

and joy of the soul found in Greece had given way to toil.
Since Rome was a combination of many peoples, it was difficult
to keep together .
. . . it directly involves the severest discipline, and
self-sacrifice to the grand object of the union.
A State
which first had to form itself, and which is based on force
must be held together by force.
It is not a moral, liberal
connection, but a compulsory condition of subordination,
that results from such an origin.49
Like other men of the Enlightenment, Hegel admired the
form or the institutions of the Roman world, but he believed
that the natural side of the spirit was unhappy in the Roman
world.

Christianity arose to fill this need.

Hegel believed

that Christianity would release man's spirit for a higher goal;
man had found a fountain of infinity in himself.

"This higher

Spirit involves the reconciliation and emancipation of Spirit;
while man obtains the consciousness of Spirit in its universality
and infinity.

4

1150

The Roman world declined because of internal

9Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 284.

SOibid., p. 319
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problems, and because of its expansion abroad; it became
unfaithful to the principles that had built it--consistency
and firmness within itself.

Freedom had developed since the

Orient for now some knew that they were free.

But the fact

that there were slaves in Greece and Rome prevented all men
from being conscious of their freedom.
"The German Spirit is the Spirit of the new World.

Its

aim is the realization of absolute Truth as the unilimited
self-determination of Freedom--that Freedom which has its own
absolute form itself as its purport."5 1

Thus, the German

world represented the culmination of all the previous aspects
of historical development.

From such a conclusion, criticism

of Hegel was made for his alleged glorification of the Prussian
state.

But Shlomo Avineri refuted the idea the Hegel was an

ardent nationalist.

Avineri felt that Sibree did not distin-

guish between the German world and Germany in his translation
of the Philosophy of History.

The principle uniting the people

of Europe was Christianity, not race or nationality.

The German

world would be composed of Germany, Spain, France, England, Italy,
and maybe even Russia; this would be a multiplicity of political
units in the manner of Greece according to Avineri.5 2

Avineri

may be stretching his point for Hegel tied the growth of secular

5 1 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 341.

5 2 Shlomo Avineri, flHegel and Nationalism, 11 in Kaufmann,
ed., Political Philosophy, p. 130
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freedom to the advent of Protestantism.

Not all of the states

Avineri mentioned can be considered Protestant.
Hegel's formula for the development of history must be
modified in the German world.

The German people did not begin

their life within themselves, but took up foreign ideas and
made them their own.

The previous world historical peoples,

the Greeks and Romans, developed their culture before coming
in contact with their predecessors.

"The process of culture

they (German world) underwent consisted in taking up foreign
elements and reductively amalgamating them in their own natural
life.

Thus their history presents an introversion--the attrac-

tion of alien forms of life and the bringing these to bear on
their own. 1153

The development of Christianity in the Roman

world and its further development in the German realm made the
German world the world of completion for Hegel.

"For the Chris-

tian world is the world of completion; the grand principle of
being realized, consequently the end of days is fully come.
The Idea can discover in Christianity no point in the aspirations of Spirit that is not satisfied.

1154

The German world was the end of history for the spirit
was present both in religious and secular life.

With the coming

of the Reformation, the power of the Catholic Church weakened

53 Hegel, Philosophy of History, pp. 341-342.
54 Ibid., p. 342.
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and the monarchy consolidated its power.

The realization

arose that the secular edifices of life were capable of
embodying truth and spirit according to Hegel.

Elements

outside the Church could contain good as well as evil.
The development and advance . . . that Spirit, having
now gained the consciousness of its Freedom, through that
process of mediation which takes place between man and
God . . . . It is now perceived that Morality and Justice in the State are also divine and commanded by God,
and that in poin§ of substance there is nothing higher
or more sacred.5
Hegel sounds utopian in his treatment of the state.
By the process of reason, man could build an ideal state on
earth.

All of the possibilities that Hegel thought possible

were present in the German state; conditions were right for
man to build his utopia.

The development of Christianity had

freed man to develop the objective freedom of the state as well
as the subjective freedom of religion, art, and philosophy.
Man's free will was the highest of all rights for it was the
right that had been developing since the beginning of history.
Religion, especially Protestantism, released man's will to
accomplish the work of reason in the secular world.

Most

important, all men were free and were conscious of their
freedom.
Hegel did not predict the future course of history;
he was not a prophet but a philosopher.
that Hegel made was about America.

The only prediction

"America is therefore the

55 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 422.
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land of the future, where, in the ages that lies before us,
the burden of the World's History shall reveal itself . .
It is for America to abandon the ground on which hitherto the
History of the World has developed itself. 1156

Hegel did not

indicate which direction America would take to abandon the
ground of world history.

One can only speculate.

It is

apparent that the spirit was well developed in the German
world in both secular and religious aspects.

Perhaps this

development could be carried further in America; perhaps he
felt that democracy could be evolved into a more viable form
than that form which existed in Greece.
Hegel's philosophy of history was the idea unfolding
itslef in space as nature and in time as the mind.

The mind

was actually the driving force in world history--it was the
process of reason realizing itself.
development.

The story of history was

But there might be instances when the 'cunning

of Reason' sacrificed the particular instance for the general
progress of reason as in the case of individuals.

Since reason

prevailed, man could change this course by using his mind.

The

only deterministic factor in this philosophy was that man was
capable of reason and could use the lessons of history in his
search for perfectibility.
Hegel's philosophy was the attempt by a man of insight to
understand his world by reflection.

Other great men have attempted

5 6Hegel, Philosophy of History, pp. 86-87.

37
to understand by experiment; Hegel chose a more theoretical
way.

Unlike scientific theories, historical theories cannot

be proven.

They can be used to give insight and perspective

but they do not provide any concrete answers.

As Hegel said,

"As the essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand,
we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is
Freedom. 1157

It is much easier for the scientist to measure

gravity than for the philosopher to measure freedom.

There

have been comparisons between Hegel's world view and the world
view put forth by twentieth century physicists.

Walter Kauf-

mann observed a carving over a fireplace at Princeton University
which stated, "Raffiniert ist der Herr Gott, aber boshaft ist
er nicht."

Kaufmann translated this effort of Albert Einstein 1 s

as, "God's sly, but he ain't mean. 1158
to either Hegel or Einstein.

God was not omnipotent

Just as Einstein believed that

there was reason in nature, however subtle, Hegel believed
that there was reason in the human mind--the world had not
been abandoned to mere accident and chaos.
As the reader ventures beyond this point, there are
some basic elements of Hegel's philosophy that he should
remember.

Hegel viewed history as a reasonable process in

spite of its periods of instability.

Man, too, was a reasonable

57Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 17.
5 8Kaufmann, Hegel, p. 265.
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creature i.e., he knew the difference between good and evil;
because of his divine spark, Hegel believed as a Romantic that
man should be able to improve.
man if he would only learn.

History had lessons to offer

One of the primary lessons was

that man's awareness of himself as being free had developed
from lower to higher stages.

Beginning in the Orient where

only one was free, the consciousness of freedom traveled to
Greece and Rome where man realized that only some are free to
the German world where, at last, in the obstruct all men are
free.

In addition Hegel found patterns within these world

historical nations that showed why empires rose and fell.
World historical peoples or nations were those empires
that have the highest culture and were most powerful for that
period of time.

World historical individuals were men who

were aware of the spirit of the times and arose to lead their
people in a time of need.

Geographical conditions played a

part in helping to determine the spirit of a nation for Hegel
believed that man must have a reasonable freedom from nature
in order to develop his mind.

A final point the reader should

be aware of is that Hegel's dialectic is not an abstraction
applied to history but history itself; it is the development of
logic in the mind and in history as Hegel saw it.

CHAPTER III
THE AMERICAN WORLD
Hegel did not believe that man had learned any lessons
from history.

But his writings, especially his Philosophy of

History, illustrate his attempt to learn from the past and to
formulate what he had learned in a general equation.

He

believed that the great civilizations of the past, Greece and
Rome, had certain historical trends in common.

Hegel was

unlike many others who attempt to understand the growth and
decline of great empires; he felt that man's ability to
reason and to progress should enable him to avoid some of
the errors of history.

Even though Hegel ended his history

with the German world of the early nineteenth century, he
felt that America was the land of the future where the burden
of history would reveal itself.

Perhaps he felt that America

was the land where people would begin to pay attention to
history and to learn from the mistakes of their predecessors.
Hegel spent little time on America in his writings
for he was concerned with the past.

He did not consider

America as a true state yet, for it had not been subjected
to the pressures of a state.

Hegel noted that what had

happened in America was only a reflection of Europe, but he
mentioned that "It is for America to abandon the ground on
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which hitherto the History of the World has developed
itself." 59

What the new ground might be was left to

the reader's imagination.

This author has based a general

view of American history on the phases that Hegel found in
other great civilizations.

It is an attempt to view American

history as Hegel might have viewed it.
America occupies the fifth state of universal history.
In this most highly developed stage of history the world
historical spirit in America is extremely strong.

Each

person is conscious of his own freedom and of the fact that
not all of the world's peoples are free.

Time was relative

for Hegel for time was only a husk which could be thrown
away when the spirit of a nation had matured.

Hegel would

consider time to be eternal in America:

. length of

"

Time is something relative, and the element of Spirit is
Eternity.

Duration, properly speaking, cannot be said to
60
belong to it."
In America, too the separation between church and
state became an idea developing from the spirit of the people.

This idea was embodied in the Constitution:

the secular

spirit became equal to the religious spirit in the realm of
law as well as in the realm of belief.

Hegel noted in

59Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 87.
6 0ibid., p. 110.
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Germany that "The state no longer occupies a position of
real inferiority to the Church and is no longer subordinate
to it.

The latter asserts no prerogatives, and the Spiritual

is no longer an element foreign to the State. 1161

Freedom

could not develop on a higher plane; Hegel believed that the
spirit of religion was a harsh bondage for it was control
by superstition rather than reason.

The consciousness that

all are free -- reason in the secular state has been most
perfectly developed in the America nation because of the
separation of church and state.
There were three stages in Hegel's analysis of the
rise and fall of states.

America has passed through the

first stage of development and is now in the midst of her
second stage, the period when power is at its highest.
The first stage in the development of the American nation
began when the weary of Europe left their homeland.

These

people realized that the spiritual part of their state and
their religion were in conflict.

In America, the land of

the future, they hoped to reconcile this problem.

Hegel

predicted that "America is therefore the land of the future,
where in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the
World History shall reveal itself .

61 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 109.

62 Ibid., p. 86.

The citizens
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of the New World did not find their freedom complete however.
The constitution of England was developed for the spirit of
the English people.

New geographical and social conditions

changed the outlook of the immigrants, and they soon looked
upon the English laws as foreign laws.

It was up to the

new spirit to throw off the old for Hegel noted, "What has
taken place in the New World up to the present time is only
an echo of the Old World--the expression of a foreign
life;

.
Hegel might view the Revolutionary War as the emergence

of the spirit of the American people.

In this period a

government was formed based on a constitution that was a
result of the times and the conditions in America instead
of England.

As time progressed, the Constitution changed

because of different needs.

Amendments were needed to

clarify or extend the rights and duties of citizens.
Thus, the constitution is, but just as essentially it
becomes, i.e., it advances and matures. This advance
is an alteration which is imperceptible and which
lacks the form of alteration . • . . Hence the advance
from one state of affairs to another is tranquil in
appearance and unnoticed.
In this way a constitution
changes over a long period of time into some ting
quite different from what it was originally.

5

Prior to the Civil War many Americans began to realize

63Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 87.
64 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 291.
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that only some were free since slavery existed in the
southern part of America.

But Hegel believed that slavery

was a necessary part of democracy for slaves were needed
to do the work.

The full-time efforts of all citizens were

needed to run a country.

This was one of Hegel's chief

criticisms of a democracy as he had observed it in Greece.
The Civil War did much to resolve the conflict between
property rights and the idea of human freedom in the
American nation.
Following the Civil War, a period of reconstruction
and consolidation occurred in America.

The most important

event in this period being the two meetings with the previous
world historical people--the German nation.

In World War I,

America showed that she had become a match for Germany:
America was the successor to Germany as a world historical
people.

It was also in this period that American foreign

policy took on a crusading atmosphere.

President Wilson's

pleas to "make the world safe for democracy" set the stage
for latter attempts at a moralistic foreign policy.

World

War II laid the might of Germany prostrate in the dust.
In this series of conflicts and the consequences that
followed, one is reminded of the Punic Wars between Rome
and Carthage.

Hegel noted that after the defeat of Carthage,

the Romans were ready for war.

"They destroyed Corinth in

the same year as Carthage and made Greece a province.

Rome
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seemed now to have attained perfect security; no external
power confronted it:

she was the mistress of the Med-

iterranean--that is of the media terra of all civilization. 116 5
Hegel neglected to mention that only a portion of Greece,
Macedonia, came under Roman control.
began to have problems:

But internally Rome

the dominant instinct of Rome,

patriotism, had been satisfied and the individual began to
feel that he was more important than the state.

Respect

for the state no longer held the opposites of private interest
and patriotic sentiment apart.

!!Rather we observe now side

by side with wars for conquest, plunder and glory, the
fearful spectacle of civil disorders in Rome, and intestine
66
wars."
Strong men arose to take control, Pompey and
Ceasar, and Rome became the property of a single person.
"The democratic constitution could no longer be really
maintained in Rome but only kept in appearance. 1167

According

to Hegel, these men were not accidents of history but
necessities for these men were necessary to hold the empire
together.

Rome had no spiritual center for all the tenden-

cies were for sovereignty and military force.

Elegance and

culture were foreign to Rome--everything was imported from

65Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 307.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., p. 311.

45
Greece.

n

. their riches were not the fruit of industry,

as was the case in Athens, but the result of plunder.n 68
America clearly has not reached this point.

It is

not in a state of civil war nor does it have to plunder
for its riches and culture.

It has problems because it is

a democracy and the many rule rather than the one or the
few.

America has a great advantage over Greece, Rome, and

the Orient for it has Christianity to heal the discord
between duty and inclination.

Spirit has a home in the

state as well as in the church:

Rome did not have this

secular spirit to heal its discord.

But as the land where

the trends of history will change, America must pay attention
to the historical lessons that Greece and Rome paid for so
highly.

American foreign policy after World War II would

be an area to which these lessons could be applied.
After World War II, relations between the Soviet Union
and western allies deteriorated.

America was determined to

retain her position of global leadership; the only apparent
way to do this was to establish bases overseas and stop
Russian expansion--peace by force.

If Russia could be

prevented from further expansion, then Communism might be
contained.

Thus American foreign policy became a crusade

of good against evil; the representatives of the people
having defined democracy as good and Communism as evil.
Diplomacy became a system of moral philosophy rather than
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a way of seeking stability in world affairs.

The concern

for human freedom throughout the world became a national
.
69
habit of mind.
Hegel did not condemn these ideals for
he said, nin this case it is not private interest or
passion that desires gratification, but Reason, Justice,
Liberty; and equipped with this title the demand in question
assumes a lofty bearing, and readily adopts a position not
merely of discontent, but of open revolt against the given
world. 11 70

But this was not reality for Hegel, it was not

the world as it really was.

"These ideals--which in the

voyage of life founder on the rocks of hard reality--may
be in the first instance only subjective, and belong to the
idiosyncrasy of the individual, imagining himself the
highest and wisest."7l
Hegel's philosophy was general, not particular, and
did not deal with specific foreign policy or situations
such as the Cold War.

His philosophy can provide some

perspective, but it must remain in the background when dealing
with the Cold War.

American diplomacy operated on the

assumption that the Cold War would be a long existing

69Norman A. Graebner, Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings
in the Intellectual Tradition of American Forei n Polic
New York: Oxford University Press, 19
p. 397,
Hereafter cited as Graebner, Ideas and Diplomacy.
70Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 35.
7 1 Ibid.
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condition, and that American might would remain greater
than Russian might.

Russia believed that America was trying

to substitute her empire for the British Empire.7 2

But

there was some effort at international cooperation.

The

discussions between the major allied powers at Dumbarton
Oaks and Yalta paved the way for the United Nations Conference
in San Francisco in the summer of 1945.

In addition American

foreign aid plans such as the Truman Doctrine and the
Marshall Plan helped to modify some of the military and
ideological overtones while still providing a concurrent
policy for the containment of Communism.
A problem arose in domestic affairs in the 1950's-how could the government convince the people that peace
with Russia was impossible and, at the same time, convince
them that nuclear war was too costly to risk with any
nation?

Popular opinion had at one time believed that

Russia's dominance in Eastern Europe and Mao's success in
China were either products of an international conspiracy
or the weakness of American foreign policy. 73

The world

became a dialectical battlefield for good against evil:
Americans had no doubt as to who was good.

The large

7 2Arthur A. Ehrich, Jr., Ideas, Ideals and American
Diplomacy (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966),
p. 178. Hereafter cited as Ehrich, Ideas.
73Ibid., p. 187.
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middle class was naturally hostile to Communism.

It had

been portrayed as a creeping menace for many years and
little was done by American leadership to enlighten public
opinion.

What was largely lacking in America were men in

positions of leadership who could put foreign affairs in
a more realistic light i.e., in less moralistic tones.
The chief spokesman in the 1950's for the move to
instill morality in international relations was John Foster
Dulles.

He believed United States foreign policy should

conform to moral principles.
sufficient:

Containment was no longer

liberation was the new watchword.

According

to Dulles, "There is a moral or natural law not made by man
which determines right and wrong and in the long run only
those who conform to that law will escape disaster.

This

law has been trampled by the Soviet Union, and for that
violation they can and should be made to pay." 74

The idea

that whatever America did politically was morally right
was against Hegel's outlook on international politics and
morality.

He believed that there should be a distinction

between morals and politics.
At one time the opposition between morals and
politics, and the demand that the latter should conform
to the former, were much canvassed. The welfare of a
state has claims to recognition totally different
from those of the welfare of the individual. The

74speech by John Foster Dulles quoted in Graebner,
Ideas and Diplomacy, p. 804.
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ethical substance, the state, has its determinate
being, i.e., its right, directly embodied in something
existent, something not abstract but concrete, and
the principle of its conduct and behavior can only
be this concrete existent and not one of the many
universal thoughts supposed to be moral commands.
When politics is alleged to clash with morals and so
always be wrong, the doctrine propounded rests on
superficial ideas about morality, the nature of the
state, and the state's relation to the moral point
of view.75
The moral fervor in America that had been common
during the decade of the 1950's continued during the early
stages of the Vietnam War.
during the late 1960 1 s.

But the fervor began to diminish

Foreign policy was now defined in

terms of national honor rather than the battle of good
against evil.

American commitments to other nations would

not have meaning if America were to withdraw from Vietnam
without guaranteeing a form of government that the western
world could approve.

Most came to realize that no Southeast

Asian country was really vital to any world power, least of
all America.

It must be in this context of practicality

that America re-evaluate her foreign policy:

only then can

diplomacy return to its original purpose--arbitrating the
realm of the possible.
Hegel noted that individual morality and politics
did not mix in the realm of international affairs for the
state that had the world mind was right and only history

75Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 215,
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would reveal the right.

It was not necessarily bad that

states did not see eye to eye for much good could come
from conflict.

Private interests, passions, vices could

not be ignored but must be considered as the driving force
behind history.

II

. we may affirm absolutely that

nothing great in the World has been accomplished without
passion. 11 7 6

The 'cunning of reason' frequently sacrificed

the individual and his passions in order to further the
interests of the state according to Hegel.

76Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 23.

CHAPTER IV
THE VIETNAM WORLD
The site of conflict between the world historical
people, America, and a nation struggling to find its identity
in the world is the Indochinese Peninsula.

In the Hegelian

view the spirit of a people must originate in the natural
conditions of their geographieal environment.77. In the
frigid and torrid zones there is no chance for a world
historical people to develop.

"It is not our concern to

become acquainted with the land occupied by nations as
external locale, but with the natural type of locality, as
intimately connected with the type and character of the people
which is the offspring of such a soil."78

Nature is one

set of circumstances which must not obstruct the development
of the mind.

Most of Vietnam lies within the torrid zone;

here nature is tttoo powerful to allow Spirit to build up
a world for itself.

11

Hegel would argue that Vietnam could

not become a world historical nation because it lay outside
the temperate zone.

However, Hegel was neither careful

nor precise in his geography and he included Egypt within
the Persian Empire even though Egypt lies within the
"torrid zone".

On the basis of this anomaly this author

77Hegel, Philosophy of History, pp. 79-80.
78 Ibid., p. 80.
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has treated Vietnam's geography as Hegel treated Egypt's
geography.

In both regions the spirit emerged after its

struggle against nature.
Geographical conditions have had an effect upon
the people of Vietnam in many ways.

Its city-states, kingdoms,

and empires were isolated from each other, yet they were
greatly influence by the civilizations of China, India, and
the western world since the sea provided a convenient
highway for foreign intrusions.

However, local customs and

races persisted despite foreign invasions.

Geography also

encouraged the area to be oriented to an agricultural
economy with a basic diet of rice and fish.

Thus while its

spiritual development lay outside the limits laid down by
Hegel, geography was a factor in determining the local
economy.
It was in this setting that the spirit of nationalism
arose in the Vietnamese people about 40 A.D.

Originally

two kingdoms existed, Annam in the north and central regions
of Vietnam, and Champa in the south.
were originally of Chinese stock:

The Annamese people

the peoples of Yueh--

the Chinese equivalent of Viet--lived in the Yangzte Valley
as early as 1000 B.C.

By the sixth century B.C. the Yueh

peoples had migrated to the southern boundaries of China;
by the third century B.C. they were spilling over into
Vietnam.

The eighteenth parallel is believed to have been
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the southern boundary of migration at this time.

Towards

the end of the third century, the first Chinese emperor,
Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, extended Chinese conquest almost to
the present city of Saigon.

The Yueh peoples were incor-

porated into the province of Hsiang in southern China.
China maintained control of the region until 40 A.D. when
the first signs of Vietnamese nationalism arose.

The

nobility, led by their queen, Trung Trac, arose but were
defeated.

Thereafter, Chinese garrisons were maintained

in Annam and Chinese customs, schools, letters, and
institutions were influential at least among the upper
classes.

There were two more unsuccessful uprisings in

543 and 602 A.D.79
Vietnam's separation from China occurred in connection
with the decline of the T'ang dynasty which began in the late
ninth century.

The T'ang dynasty could not protect Hanoi

from the attacks of Nan Chao Thai from Yunnan who raided as
far as the Red River Valley in 862-863.

Vietnamese

independence came in 939 after the T'ang dynasty collapsed.
Between 1409-1428 there was another short period of Chinese
rule, but a war of independence led by the Annamese Le Loi,

7 9 Milton W. Meyer, Southeast Asia: A Brief History
(Totawa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1965),
pp. 20-21. Hereafter cited as Meyer, Southeast Asia.

54
drove the Chinese out of Annam. 80

Encouraged by their

successes, the Le dynasty expanded south and west.
The kingdom of Champa in the south was influenced
by India rather than China.

In 192 A.D. the Hindu ruler,

Sru Mara, organized Champa in spite of local resistance.
Towns were set up along the coast for trade with India,
China, Persia, and Arabia.

The rulers of Champa traded

with India but also paid tribute to China, in this way they
were able to maintain their independence over many centuries.
The nationalistic Annamese destroyed the independence of
the Champa in 1471 when they annexed two of the five
provinces of Champa.Bl
A common cause encouraged the Chams and the Annamese
to band together to repel the land and sea invasions by
the Mongols.

Champa and North Vietnam then broke their

cordial relations and returned to civil war.

In 1407 the

fleet of the Ming dynasty dispersed Annamese forces and
took control of Annam from 1409 to 1428.

Champa appealed

to China for help against Annam again in 1446, but the Ming
dynasty had lost interest in that part of Southeast Asia. 82

80 John F. Cady, Southeast Asia:

Its Historical
Development (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964),
p. 17, 103, Hereafter cited as Cady, Southeast Asia.
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82 cady, Southeast Asia, p. 105.

55
By the seventeenth century all of the provinces of Champa
were annexed by the Annamese.

All of Vietnam obtained a

a Chinese culture with the invasion, and fifteen dynasties
kept this tradition alive until the French took over Indochina
in the nineteenth century.
European colonialsim extended its influence to
Vietnam when Colbert, chief minister of Louis XIV, revived
the French East India Company in 1664.

The French East

India Company came as colonizers and, together with the
missionaries of the Catholic Church, they attempted to
regulate the affairs of Vietnam.
was under French influence.

By 1874 all of Vietnam

There were small nationalistic

drives as illustrated by the Emperor Tu Due in 1851
ordering all French to be seized and thrown into the
sea with stones around their necks. 8 3

The French forces

were even defeated on several instances by Vietnam forces.
But despite these temporary setbacks, the French maintained
their grip on the region through the Surete, the French
Foreign Legion, and the political prison on the island of
Paulo Condore.

Most of the men who came to Indochina

came for economic reasons.

Merchants who supplied the

8 2 cady, Southeast Asia, p. 105.
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soldiers, traders, and administrators all hoped to further
themselves even if it was at the expense of the public
treasury.
The victory of Japan over a western power, Russia,
in 1905 also did much to stimulate Vietnamese nationalism.
Some Vietnamese came to believe that the only way for an
Asian country to assert itself against the West was to
acquire the general and scientific knowledge of the West.
A period of intense educational activity followed in
Vietnam. 8 5

Nationalism was given further impetus by the

1911 revolution in China when the Vietnamese Nationalist
Party was formed in Vietnam.

World War I became a turning

point for many Vietnamese nationalists as many went to
France during this period and learned of ideologies-democracy and Communism--and of the follies of colonialism.
They vowed to return home eventually to do battle with the
latter.
London on the eve of World War I was the home of
a Vietnamese kitchen helper--Nguyen Tat Thanh, also known
as Nguyen Ai Quoc, but later known to the rest of the
world as Ho Chi Minh.
moved to Paris.

Shortly after the war ended Ho

Here he received word that his sister in

84 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam:

A Political History
(New York, Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968),
p. 121, 131. Hereafter cited as Buttinger, Vietnam.
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Vietnam had been sentenced to nine years at hard labor
for revolutionary activities.

Ho decided to lobby at

the Versailles Peace Conference for an end to French
colonialism.

Even though he was ignored by the delegates,

he came to the attention of Charles Longuet, a prominent
journalist and Karl Marx's son-in-law.

Hors life thereafter

was devoted to the ideal of the liberation of his fatherland.

After becoming a member of the French Communist

Party, Ho Chi Minh studied for two years in Moscow, and
then went to Canton as an interpreter for a group headed
by Michael Borodin, the Comintern's envoy to the revolutionary
government.

Ho's career has only vague outlines from this

point on for he spent most of the next twenty-five years
pursuing or being pursued.

He never fired a shot in

action or gave a command in battle, but he was a master
organizer and decision maker.

In this man and his

followers, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, modern
Vietnamese nationalism found its unifiers and leaders.85
Ho Chi Minh visited America briefly during his
life in the merchant marine.

He was ashore in New York

City and in several ports in the southern states.

Ho was

particularly impressed with the problems of the Negroes in

8 5Jean LaCouture, Ho Chi Minh: A Political
Biography (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 1-75.
Hereafter cited as LaCouture, Ho Chi Minh
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the South, the struggle for independence of the American
colonies, and with Abraham Lincoln's role in freeing
oppressed peoples.

When Ho drafted a declaration for

Vietnam in September of 1945, it was obvious where he
obtained his model.
All men are born equal. They are endowed by
nature with certain unalienable rights, among which
are life, libert~ and the pursuit of
happiness . . . . 6
If Ho Chi Minh believed in America's willingness to help
Vietnam because their histories possessed common themes,
then he was doomed to disappointment.

After the death

of Roosevelt the myth was quickly punctured by the Truman
administration.
Hegel might have found some of the qualities of
an Oriental despot in Ho Chi Minh.

He ruled through his

party with an iron hand and demanded obedience from his
subjects as he would have demanded obedience from a child.
Diaries of Viet Cong soldiers have revealed a strict
morality imposed from above. 8 7

They had been warned not to

steal food from the local population nor to antagonize them
in any way; punishment was harsh for offenders.

North

86speech by Chou En-lai, May 12, 1954 in The 1954
Geneva Conference: Indo-China and Korea (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 125.
8 7Marcus Raskin and Bernard Fall, Vietnam Reader
(New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 222.
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Vietnam was organized as a giant family garrisoned against
attack.

Uncle Ho may have looked like a kindly old man

to many but Hegel would have said that only he was free.
"For the Sustance is simply an individual--the emperor-whose law constitutes all the disposition.

Here we have

the One Being of the State supremely dominant--the
Sustance, which still hard and inflexible, resembles nothing
but itself--included no other element."88

In a Hegelian view

Ho Chi Minh probably would take the place of emperor.
On the other hand, Ho's movement was successful
because it was based on exploiting the discontent of
many individuals.

The Vietnamese were treated harshly

under French rule, and for many, Ho Chi Minh was a great
improvement over the French.

Whatever constitution

existed during the colonial days was not the result

of

the combined will of the people but a document transplanted
from foreign soil.

II

. it is absolutely essential that

the constitution should not be regarded as something made,
even if it has come into being in time.

It must be

treated as something existent in and by itself, as divine
therefore, and constant, and so exalted above the things
that are made." 8 9

The rule that the French imposed was

88 Hegel, Philosophy of History, pp. 120-121.
S9Hegel, Philosoph1 of Right, p. 178.
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not based on the spirit of the people of Vietnam for in
this case the French acted as the real Oriental despots.
The spirit of the people was willing to rebel; they have
wanted freedom and believed they found their great man in
Ho Chi Minh for, in many respects, Ho had a fairly wide
political base.

This in itself would give him followers

in the war against French colonialism.

Hegel's concept

of an Oriental despot no longer applies in the twentieth
century; the true patriarchal condition of ancient Chinese
history no longer exists.

Hegel would argue that the

spirit of nationalism which had spread its roots throughout Vietnamese history was now in full bloom.

The time

was ripe for the spirit to emerge from its struggle with
nature.

CHAPTER V
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AMERICA AND NORTH VIETNAM
In order to apply Hegel's philosophy of history and
politics to the war between America and North Vietnam, one
must have some conception of the history of America's
involvement.

It is difficult to determine the date when

America and Vietnam began to have contact.

There was

little trade between the two countries probably because
the French did not want it, but by 1940 the State Department
had assigned a consular officer to Hanoi.90

America

became more involved in Vietnam during World War II as a
result of French colonialism and Japanese aggression.
Due to the long 1,200 mile coastline of Vietnam, and the
lack of men and supplies, the French could not defend
Indochina from foreign invasion.

In June of 1940 the

French began a series of agreements with Tokyo that
eventually allowed Japan complete freedom in Vietnam.
In July of 1941 President Roosevelt made an effort to
stop the Japanese occupation of Indochina.

He volunteered

his help in making Indochina and Thailand neutral if the
Japanese would withdraw their forces.

Japan in turn asked

90chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in
Vietnam (New York:
Dodd, Mead and Co., 1970), p. 18.
Hereafter cited as Cooper, The Lost Crusade.
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for such far ranging concessions from America that Roosevelt
could not accept them.
In August of 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill held their
Atlantic Conference and one of the decisions was to resist
any new Japanese aggression in Asia. 91

Japan paid little

attention to their demands and they gradually added bases,
sea ports, and airstrips to their conquests in Indochina.
In March of 1945 the Japanese realized that allied invasion
was imminent so they imprisoned most of the French units
that remained in Indochina.

Vietnam was now theoretically

an independent nation, but its rulers were constantly
reminded that they were expected to collaborate with Japan.
11

Bao Dai (the Vietnamese emperor) allegedly hoped that the

Americans would soon land in Vietnam and take the Japanese
off his peoples' backs. 11 9 2
It was during these World War II years that the basis
was laid for the Viet Minh--the League for the Independence
of Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, a Communist-

Nationalist with a Ph.D. in political economy, helped put
together this resistance movement in Chingsi, a small town
in China's southern province of Kwangsi.

The nucleus of

this group was made up of the outlawed Indochinese Communist

9 1 cooper, The Lost Crusade, pp. 18-21.

9 2Buttinger, Vietnam, p. 206.
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Party, but there were also representatives of several
Vietnamese nationalist groups.

The short term aim of this

group was the ouster of the Japanese and the long term
plan was the liberation of all of Vietnam from foreign
control.

The group was not well-supplied or armed, but

it was highly motivated and it had the potential to cause
the Japanese and later successors a lot of trouble.
Ho Chi Minh paid several visits to the United States Special
Forces Headquarters in southern China in 1944 and 1945, for
he heard that the Americans were planning an invasion of
Indochina.

Although Ho was seeking arms, he also made

friends with several of the men stationed with the Special
Forces.

He supplied the Americans with intelligence on

Japanese activities.

The equipment that Ho received may

have been nothing more than a few pistols and some ammunition.
There was some collaboration between the Viet Minh and
American forces however.93
With the threat of the American invasion of Indochina,
the Japanese pulled back from the seacoast and the Chinese
border, and Ho and his guerillas went to the work in the
liberation of Vietnam.

Meanwhile Roosevelt seemed determined

to loosen the hold that France had held on Indochina.94

93LaCouture, Ho Chi Minh, pp. 266-270.
9 4 cooper, The Lost Crusade, p. 33; Buttinger,
Vietnam, p. 205.
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In March of 1943 Eden and Roosevelt tried to work out a
policy that would place Indochina under a trusteeship.
Britian was somewhat skeptical because it might threaten
parts of her own empire and the subject of a trusteeship
was not considered seriously again.

Nothing definite was

decided at either the Yalta or Potsdam Conferences or the
San Francisco United Nations Conference, but there was
some feeling that the United Nations might establish a
trusteeship over the area.

When the war ended, Britian

accepted the return of South Vietnam from the Japanese
and China accepted the return of the North; both countries
were prepared to let the French return at their convenience.95
The myth Ho Chi Minh and his followers believed-that official American settlement was in favor of Viet Minh
control--did not last long.

Even though Special Forces

officers and some other officials looked upon Ho as a
nationalist, he had been tainted by his association with
Russian and Chinese Communists and by his years of guerilla
warfare with the Indochinese Communist Party.

As French

troops returned to Indochina clad in American uniforms and
carrying American weapons, much of the faith that the
Vietnamese nationalists had in the West deteriorated.
Roosevelt's anti-French policy was definitely not to be
carried out.

95cooper, The Lost Crusade, pp. 28-41.
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The Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh were much better
organized and armed than the returning French troops so by
September 2, 1945, Ho was able to proclaim a republic at
Hanoi.

Hue and Saigon were also controlled by revolutionary

groups.

A few scattered French soldiers of the Eleventh

Regiment of the colonial infantry that had been imprisoned
by the Japanese seized some buildings in Saigon that had been
occupied by the Committee of the Liberation of South
Vietnam.

This minor rebellion by French soldiers began

the French war in Indochina.
really a series of three wars.

The Indochinese War was
The first war, the colonial

expedition, began in September 1945 and ended in March 1948
when the French recognized Vietnamese independence.

This

colonial war in turn could also be divided into three parts:
the first ran from October 1945 until March 1946 in which
General LeClerc and ten thousand men tried to re-establish
French rule in Indochina.

Only partially successful,

LeClerc signed an agreement with Ho in March 1946 that gave
Vietnam its independence within the French Union.

France

got the right to keep garrisons in Vietnam for five years.
The second phase, a period of truce, lasted to December of

1946.

In December the Viet Minh renewed their initiative

against the French because of the breakdown of political
agreements, and Ho Chi Minh moved into the Tonkin middle
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region to conduct the guerilla war. 96
The second war was a civil war.

The French encouraged

a nationalist movement against the Viet Minh.

In June of

1948 the provisional government of Vietnam was set up headed
by a General Xuen; few Vietnamese associated themselves
with the regime so the French had to look elsewhere for
leadership.

The former emperor, Bao Dai, was installed

by the French in Saigon in June of 1949.

In the eyes of

the Vietnamese people the Viet Minh had become patriots
defending their country against a puppet of colonialism.
The Viet Minh became the spirit of resistance against all
influence and imperialism from abroad.97
The third war, the internationalization of the war,
began in two ways.

Early in 1950 the Chinese forces were

deployed to the northern frontiers of Vietnam and Laos,
and the French General Lattre de Tassigney, made a trip
to Washington to present the war as the French crusade
against the Red Tide engulfing Asia.

Events in Europe at

this time conditioned the Truman Administration's policy
of ignoring European colonial ambitions in Asia.

Since the

Soviet Union was considered to be a menace to all of
Europe, NATO needed all the help it could get from France.

96Jean LaCouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces
(New York: Vintage Books, 1966), pp. 7-8. Hereafter cited
as LaCouture, Vietnam.
97Ibid., p. 9,
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Perhaps, then, it was more important to ignore France's
colonial ambitions in return for backing in the defense
of Europe.

The defeat of Communism in Europe was more

important than stopping colonialism in Asia.

However the

defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces by the
Communists under Mao caused Washington to wake up--Europe
was not the only part of the world where the Communist
peril was evident.

By 1950 Ho Chi Minh had a regular army

of sixty thousand men, armed with Russian and Chinese
weapons, and trained in the southern province of China.9 8
Perhaps it was now time for America to aid her European
allies in their alleged battle with the

11

Red Tide".

In February of 1950 America recognized the regime
of the Bao Dai and with it went military assistance to the
French and economic help to the Bao Dai.

Between early

1950 and the spring of 1960, America supplied $2.6 billion
to the French--this was eighty per cent of the French military
effort.

The Bao Dai government got $126 million in economic

and military aid.99

As one Washington wit summed it up,

"Washington kept hold of French colonialism as it disappeared

98cooper, The Lost Crusade, p. 59.
99rbid.
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down the drain. 11100
The political and military incompetence of the French
prevented them from winning any decisive victories over the
Viet Minh.

It became apparent that the Viet Minh were not

a collection of motley dissidents but a well trained army
who were successful in holding off everything the French
could afford to throw at them.

At the same time in France

there was mounting public pressure for settlement.

In

America the domestic situation had an effect on American
foreign policy.

When Eisenhower campaigned for the presidency,

he severly criticized Truman's handling of the Korean War.
Eisenhower took credit for ending the Korean War so he was
wary of involving America in another war.

In addition it

was apparent to some that the Vietnam conflict was different
from the Korean War--to some observers Vietnam involved
civil conflict. 101
There were only a limited number of diplomatic
maneuvers that America could engage in with regard to France.
The war was becoming increasingly unpopular in France so

lOOJohn F. Cady, "The Historical Background of United
States Policy in Southeast Asia," (Cambridge, Mass.: 1963),
p. 21, in Cooper, The Lost Crusade, p. 62.
101 cooper, The Lost Crusade, p. 64; Robert F. Randle,
Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 13.
Hereafter cited as Randle, Geneva 1954.
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if America encouraged France to keep fighting, she could
be accused of fighting to the last French soldier.

Another

alternative for America would be to press France to allow
an American training mission to expedite the Navarre plan.
This plan called for a buildup to 350,000 men composed of
300,000 Vietnamese and 50,000 French Union troops.

A third

alternative would be for America to commit her own forces
to Vietnam, but Congress probably would not react favorably
after the Korean War episode.

Finally America could

increase diplomatic pressure to persuade the French to grant
independence to the associated states.

However, if the

French pulled out, the Viet Minh were likely to take over.
This would antagonize the French and jeopardize the European
Defense Community treaty which had yet to be ratified
by the French Assembly.102
Eisenhower supported the EDC, the eighty-third Congress
backed it, and America put pressure on France to ratify it.
John Foster Dulles, in a speech to the North Atlantic
Treaty Council on 14 December 1953, said that if the EDC
did not become effective, America would have to re-evaluate
her aid policy towards Vietnam.

The Eisenhower administration

regarded Indochina as strategically important, for American
officials believed that Ho wanted a federated Communist state

102 Randle, Geneva 1954, pp. 9-15.
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in Indochina with some control over Cambodia and Laos.
There were strong doubts about the success of the Navarre
Plan in Washington but America did not want to butt into
French affairs too much.

The most acceptable alternative

for America was to provide funds and military hardware to
the French, and to support the Laniel government's refusal
to negotiate directly with the Democratic Republic of
North Vietnam.

At this point the Indochina War had not

caught on in Washington.
In 1953 there was a slight thaw in America's cold
war with Russia.

Joseph Stalin had died, Russia had

tested her first H bomb, and her domestic and foreign
policies emphasized production of consumer goods and
peaceful coexistence with the West.

There was some

conjecture in Washington that Russia had pressured the
Chinese Communists into the Korean Armistice in July of
1953.

There was even hope that the Soviet Union would be

able to reduce tensions in Indochina; there were continual
diplomatic exchanges between Russia and America throughout
1953.

103
Representatives from England, France, and America

met in Bermuda in December of 1953 to discuss mutual
problems including Indochina.

Churchill, Eisenhower, and

l03Randle, Geneva 1954, pp. 17-19.
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Bidault all agreed that the peace feelers of the DRVN
should be ignored for there were indications that Ho
would negotiate with France for peace.

In mid-December

of 1953 Ho sent a telegram to the Stockholm Expressen
indicating that he might negotiate.

Ho also made a speech,

broadcast from Moscow, on the seventh anniversary of the
Indochinese War.

All of these feelers were suspect by the

western powers; Communists were still not to be trusted
even at the price of peace.

Still negotiations might have

yielded some practical results for by the fall of 1953,
the Viet Minh controlled northern and northwestern Tonkin,
the central highlands of Annam, and sections of the Mekong
Delta in Cochin China.

The Red River delta and Hanoi,

Haiphong, Hue, and Tourane in central Vietnam and the major
cities of Cochin China including Saigon remained in French
lands. 104

The Viet Minh continued their aggressive policy

by allowing General Giap, Commander of the Peoples' Army
of Vietnam, to move into Laos.

In January of 1954 PAVN

held half of Laos and part of northern Cambodia:

by mid-

April the French garrison of Dien Bien Phu was under seige
by the Viet Minh.

Many officials in the Eisenhower

administration were making threatening noises about the
situation.

Secretary of State Dulles, Admiral Radford,

104 Randle, Geneva 1954, p. 8.
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and Vice President Nixon made statements that gave rise to
rumors that America might use an atomic bomb to relieve
the French garrison.

Two American aircraft carriers carrying

nuclear warheads were sent into the Gulf of Tonkin. 1 05
American involvement was growing; it was not just a matter
of backing up France--America's policy of containment
was apt to be wiped out if Dien Bien Phu fell.

It was

evident that French public opinion would not allow any
more French troops to be sent to Vietnam; it was also clear
that the French could not win with their present commitments.
At the Berlin Conference held in January and
February of 1954 between the Big Four Powers, many basic
decisions were made.

During the last two weeks of the

conference, the leaders discussed the Korean settlement,
the Indochinese War, and the participation of the Peoples'
Republic of China in the upcoming Geneva Conference.

France

wanted China to participate so that she might be persuaded
to stop giving aid to the Viet Minh.

Dulles insisted on

a provision that stated that America still did not recognize
the Peoples' Republic of China.

The powerful "China Lobbyn

in Congress viewed the State Department policy of the
Roosevelt and Truman administrations as treacherous during
the post-war years.

They believed that disloyal persons

l05cooper, The Lost Crusade, p. 72.
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in these administrations had caused the fall of Nationalist
China.

Even if Dulles were open-minded enough to allow

participation by the Communists, he must protect himself
from the nchina Lobbyn headed by Senator Knowland.
One further note illustrated the concern and involvement of America even before the Geneva Conference.

On

3 February 1954, Eisenhower announced that the military
advisory group in Indochina would be increased by two
hundred men; the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was
unhappy about this since they had not been informed of
the move.

Bedell Smith reassured them that it would not

happen again--the air force would be withdrawn by mid-July
1954. 106

The American attitude toward the Geneva Conference

was best illustrated by a report given by John Foster Dulles
to the Senate and to the public.

Dulles believed that the

Eisenhower administration would be held responsible for
the outcome of the Geneva Conference; this would include
any recognition of Red China and involvement in Indochina.
It was Dulles's opinion that America would not consent to
a nFar East Munich".107
The Geneva Conference began on 26 April 1954,
May 6th the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu, and

106 The New York Times, 3 Jan. 1954.
107Ibid., 21, 23 Feb. 1954.
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on May 8th the Conference opened discussion on the Indochina
problem.

Nine countries were represented at the meeting--

Russia, Communist China, France, United Kingdom, America,
Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and the Democratic Republic
of North Vietnam.

The public speeches and communiques

issued by the participants in the various sessions were
used primarily for propaganda.
the world an issue

Each country presented to

that it believed would win the sympathy

of the rest of the world.
The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in
Vietnam went into force at midnight, Geneva time, on
22 July 1954.

The document comprised six chapters, forty-

seven articles, an annex that delineated the provisional
military demarkation line and demilitarized zone, and a
final declaration.

Briefly, the documents pertaining to

the settlement of the Indochinese War contained an agreement
for ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
There were clauses prohibiting the introduction of foreign
troops and material into Vietnam except for replacement
of worn-out arms; the military demarkation line at the
seventeenth parallel was not to be construed as constituting
a political or territorial boundary.

Individuals and

property were to be protected, and there were to be no
individual or collective reprisals against people who had
collaborated with the other side.

An international
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commission composed of India, Poland, and Canada was to
supervise military withdrawals and act as an arbitrating
agency.

One of the most important clauses in the final

declaration was the provision "pending the general elections
of Viet Nam

. the conduct of civil administration

in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party
whose forces to be regrouped there in virtue of the present
Agreement.TTl08

There was disagreement as to when elections

should be set:

the French did not want to set a date at

all, the DRVN wanted to have elections six months after
the cease-fire started, and Molotov, the Russian delegate,
proposed an election date sixteen months after the
beginning of the cease-fire.

The Conference accepted

Molotov's proposal.
South Vietnam refused to sign the final declaration;
their representative lodged a formal protest against various
elements of the settlement.
into two Vietnams:

He did not like the partition

the DRVN delegates took great delight

in telling him that the partition was only a temporary
solution.

Molotov drafted many proposals in the agreement

with the consent of the Commission.

It is possible that

the South Vietnamese felt they were being sold out by their
supporters.

There was some conjecture that the DRVN

lOBRandle, Geneva 1954, pp. 569-610.
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accepted this division in order to hasten the departure
of the French army, and enable it to accept economic aid
from the West.

In addition the North Vietnamese believed

that they would meet opposition in trying to socialize a
country so individualistic, so they preferred to do it in
stages. 109

The area south of the seventeenth parallel

could be brought into the fold once the North had been
brought under control.
The French were merely trying to disentangle themselves
while upholding their honor, a position that America would
find herself in some years later.

After Dien Bien Phu had

fallen to the Viet Minh, the Laniel government had collapsed-Mendes France was the new prime minister--and French public
opinion demanded an end to Indochinese involvement.

Since

France and Vietnam promised to continue economic relations,
France would continue to profit from Vietnam, but a spectre
of future trouble arose when France recognized only the
South Vietnam government of the Bao Dai.
Bedell Smith did not associate himself with the
final declaration and did not sign it.
The Government of the United States being resolved
to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace
in accordance with the principles and purposes of
the United Nations . .
. Declares that it will
refrain from threat or use of force to disturb them

lb9LaCouture, Vietnam, p. 35,
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in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
It will view any renewal of aggression
in violation of agreements as threatening international
peace and security.110
Smith also stated that America would continue to seek unity
through free elections supervised by the United Nations
rather than an International Control Commission.
The reaction to the cease-fire in America was
mixed.

President Eisenhower on 21 July 1954 stated that

since America was not a belligerent in the war, the settlement was primarily up to those nations that participated
in the fighting.

But Eisenhower warned that he planned to

organize other nations in the collective defense of
Southeast Asia.111

On 23 July Eisenhower stated that the

Geneva Agreement was not what he would have liked:
he had no better plan, he would not criticize it.112

since
To

the right wing of the Republican Party, Senator Knowland
in particular, Geneva was one of the great Communist
victories of the decade. 11 3

The Christian Science

llORandle, Geneva 1954, pp. 344-345,
111 u.s. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and
Viet Nam.
(89th Cong. 2nd. sess., March, 1966) (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 69. Hereafter cited
as Senate Foreign Relations Report.
Statement by President
Eisenhower, 21 July 1954.
112 The New York Times, 23 July 1954.
ll3Ibid., 22 July 1954.
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Monitor 114 and the New York Herald Tribune 11 5 agreed that
the settlements were set-backs for the non-communist west.
According to the New York Times, the State Department agreed
with this assessment.116
It is evident from the preceeding discussion that
the documents arising from the Convention were not accords.
There was much left to the individual nation's discretion
according to their interpretation of the documents.

Words

such as free elections, democratic institutions, fundamental
freedoms were understood differently by the participating
powers according to their national interest.

America consented

by promising to abide by the agreements, but she did not
sign:

she was for peace but threatened intervention.
The South East Asia Treaty Organization was created

only a few days after the end of the Geneva Conference.
It had three announced purposes:

deter Communist aggression

in Southeast Asia, strengthen states of Southeast Asia with
respect to economic security and economic development, and
eliminate actual and potential factors leading to instability.117

Representatives of America, United Kingdom, France,

114 christian Science Monitor, 21 July 1954.
115New York Herald Tribune, 23 July 1954.
116The New York Times, 24 July 1954.
117The New York Times, 1 Aug. 1954.
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Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines, and Pakistan
met in Manila in September to discuss and sign the treaty.
The treaty left to the judgement of each country the kind of
action that would be taken in event of an attack.

SEATO's

power was also limited because American representatives
refused to make firm commitments of troops or arms.

Moscow,

Peking, and Hanoi denounced SEATO as an attempt to subvert
the Geneva Conference.
Ngo Dinh Diem was designated by Bao Dai to head the
Saigon government in June 1954, and just a year later Diem
dismissed the emperor and created a republic.

When the

time came for the 1956 general elections to decide on the
reunification of the two Vietnams, Diem decided that the
election would benefit only the North so he suppressed all
initiatives that would lead to reunification. 118
agreed with South Vietnam's position.

America

In a legal brief

prepared by the State Department, it was stated that the
South Vietnamese government did not sign the cease-fire
agreements or adhere to the final declaration.

The author

of this brief noted that conditions in North Vietnam during
this period were such that free elections were not possible.
North Vietnam was a Communist police state so a nation-wide
election would be a travesty.

North Vietnam had a larger

ll8LaCouture, Vietnam, p. 30.
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population than the South so an election would mean turning
the country over to the Communists. 11 9
Diem succeeded in cancelling elections in 1956 and
he became more entrenched and dictatorial in the years
that followed.

The DRVN made several attempts at holding

elections between 1956 and 1958, but they were labeled
subversive by the Diem regime.

Before 1955 the enemies

of the state were the holdovers from colonialism--after
1956 every opponent was called a Communist.

The next step

was to suppress the Viet Minh and all political and religious
sects that disagreed.

Diem set up machinery to subdue the

rebels and concentration camps were built throughout South
Vietnam.

Red suspects were herded into these camps and

detained for long periods; rumors circulated that more than
six thousand prisoners had died of food poisoning in one
camp. 120

In 1959 the official journal of South Vietnam,

The National Revolution, illustrated the attitude of the Diem
regime.
There are still people in our ranks who must be
eliminated. Their crimes equal in gravity those
of the Communists, and the nation must consider them

11 9u.s. Department of State, The Legality of United
States Participation in Defense of Vietnam, Prepared by
Leonard C. Meeker (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1966), p. 10. Hereafter cited as St~t~ Department Legal
Brief.
120 LaCouture, Vietnam, p. 30.
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as traitors. There are still people who have not
understood the all embracing truths of our methods
of combat. .
There are those who are still
indifferent. .
121
It was apparent that Diem wanted to revive the old
order--the patriarchal system of despotism rather than a
republic.

His younger brother, Ngo Dinh Can, devoted his

life to the struggle against evil--Communists and their
allies, and all foreigners.

Can wrote, "My hand will never

tire of killing Communists.

Everyone among you

should offer the life of one Red for your country.
me, mi·11·ions . . . . 122

As for

Diem's excessive dislike for

opponents of his regime helped to bring the National
Liberation Front into being in December of 1960.

Diem's

purge had forced those who disagreed with him into jail,
exile, or the guerillas.

The Third Congress of the Lao

Dong or Communist Party had expressed an interest in the
affairs of their comrades in the South:

the liberation of

South Vietnam from American imperialism was placed on an
equal footing with the socialization of the North.

The

NLF emphasized that neutrality was to be established in
the South.
American opinion continued to support Diem.
Henderson, a State Department official, stated that,

12 1LaCouture, Vietnam, p. 129.
122 Ibid., p. 20.
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"History would judge Diem as one of the great figures of
twentieth century Asia. 1112 3

In an address at Gettysburg

College in April of 1959, President Eisenhower said,
"Moreover the Government has shown real progress in cleaning
out Communist guerillas, those remaining continue to be a
disruptive influence in the nation's life."

Eisenhower

also stated that military as well as economic help was
essential to South Vietnam's existence. 124
The narrowing of the political base of the South
Vietnamese government remained as one of its major problems.
Diem moved too quickly to destroy the political power of
the sects instead of making them his allies and incorporating
their allegiance into the government.

Duong Van Minh, a

Vietnamese, noted,
When groups within society begin to work for the
whole people--no matter how small their contribution
may be--this characteristic manifests itself. The
Communists have been able to exploit honest differences
of opinion as to how to reach common objectives.
Governments have become so self-centered that they
have lost the respect of the people. People have
allowed strangers from abroad to fight for their
freedom.125

1 2 3William Henderson, "South Vietnam Finds Itself,"
Foreign Affairs, XXXIII (January, 1957), 285.
1 2 4senate Foreign Relations Report, p. 83.
Speech by President Eisenhower, April, 1959,
12 5Duong Van Minh, "A Question of Confidence,"
Foreign Affairs, XLVII (October, 1968), 85. Hereafter cited
as Minh, "A Question of Confidence".
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One of the major problems facing the government of
both North and South Vietnam has been the traditional
patriarchal loyalty of the citizen to his family, then to
his clan, then to his village, and lastly to the central
government.

The unity of the family has not been carried

over into a feeling of unity in the state as Hegel found in
an ideal state.

The government of North Vietnam has been

the most successful in incorporating these traditions into
support for the state.

In the South, government officials

cannot go into the village to gather information about
Communist activities; information must come from within
the clan.

A critical statement which illustrates the

basic problems of the Diem regime--"We rushed forward with
the trappings of democracy while our government lagged in
gaining the confidence of the people."126

Joseph Buttinger,

American foreign policy expert, summed up Diem in this way.
Diem was a highly complex political man: His
modern authoritarian ideas, his almost medieval
principles of monarchism, and his profound adherence
to some form of democracy, which together made up
his politics, resist definition.
Yet the answer to
the question of why he failed as a social reformer
could hardly be more simple: Measured against the
needs of his country and the spirit of his time, Diem
was simply too much of a conservative to discharge
his historical mission.127

12 6Duong Van Minh, "A Question of Confidence,n 90.
12 7Joseph Buttinger, "The Evolution of American
Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XLVIII (July, 1970), 12.

84
American involvement continued through the early
1960's and Diem also continued to have trouble with the
dissatisfied elements of the population.128

Throughout

1961 there were American investigators in Vietnam to study
conditions and recommend any action to be taken.

Vice

President Johnson, after visiting Vietnam, advocated additional American aid.

By end of 1962 American military

strength had reached 11,300; all of the military personnel
were involved as advisors however.
The conflict between Diem, a Catholic, and the
Buddhist monks ultimately led to Diem's downfall.

The last

chapter began in Hue on 8 May 1962 when Diem's troops fired
into a crowd of Buddhists who were displaying a religious
flag against government orders.

Monks began to immolate

themselves, government troops raided pagodas, students
rioted, and the gulf between the government and the Buddhists
widened.

"Madame Nhu's remarks about the monks putting

on a 'barbecue show' did nothing to enhance the prospects
for compromise. 1 30

In July President Kennedy began to apply

pressure to Diem to do something about the Buddhist problem:

128 rn November of 1960 Diem crushed a coup led by
Colonel Chanh Thi. On 26 February 1962 two South Vietnamese
air force officers bombed and strafed Diem's presidential
palace.
1 2 9cooper, The Lost Crusade, p. 209,
l30ibid.
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Diem answered by intensifying his raids against the pagodas.
In August the State Department issued a statement written
by Averell Harriman which stated:

"The action represented

direct violation by the Vietnamese Government of assurances
that it was pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the
Buddhists.

The United States deplores repressive actions

of this nature. 11 13 1
America did cut off some economic aid to Saigon to
encourage Diem to meliorate his policies:

the funding program

for Nhu's special forces was cancelled as was the import
aid to the Vietnamese government.

This was the first time

since 1954 that Washington had opposed Saigon's policies.
In early November of 1963 the Vietnamese army led by General
Duong Van Minh deposed Diem and both Diem and Nhu were
assassinated.

There was much disagreement as to the role

America played in the coup.

Some experts believed that

it was encouraged by the CIA; others denied America's
involvement at all.

The most likely version would be that

Henry Cabot Lodge, ambassador to Saigon, and other high
ranking officials knew that Diem was in deep political
trouble and did nothing to help him.

Army officers were

aware of this view so they were not hesitant to depose Diem.

1 3 1 u. S. Department of State, Bulletin, Prepared by
Averell Harriman (Washington: Government Printing Office,

1963),

p.

398.
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South Vietnam did not live happily ever after.
General Minh was more democratic than Diem so political
suppression was relaxed and a more relaxed atmosphere
prevailed in Saigon but basic problems were not resolved.
The military in Vietnam did not have a tradition of avoiding
political entanglements as did the American military.

As

one expert observed, nThe people of Vietnam appear to regard
the military as an arbitrary institution that is trying
to get control of the countryside without sharing the
power with the peasant villagers." 132
was not a true revolution:

The army takeover

a revolution is a process in

which the structure of all political power is permanently
changed so that new ways of mobilizing political strength
are achieved.

The extent of revolution has been successive

military dictators.

Even the pacification and Vietnamization

programs have not afforded the villagers a stake in the power
of the Republic of Vietnam.
The Viet Cong have had more success because they
have aimed at new forms of political participation.

In

many areas they have created a new sense of community by
bringing to the countryside literacy, organizational ability,
and familiarity with machines. 1 33

In contrast South

1 3 2John T. McAlister, Vietnam: The Origins of
Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 360.
Hereafter cited as McAlister, Vietnam.
133Ibid., p. 362.
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Vietnam's leaders have largely ignored local political and
economic problems.

Land reforms have been poorly planned,

official corruption has been ignored, political indifference
treated as commonplace.

To turn Vietnam into a democracy

in a few short years would require a miracle.

To expect

authority to gain the confidence of the people of Vietnam
is to ignore reality.

They have little stake in their

government or constitution.

As the Sheffield workingmen

aptly put it in 1794, "What is the constitution to us if
134
we are nothing to it?"
Less than two months after Minh's takeover, he was
ousted in another coup.

This time General Nguyen Kanh

became prime minister; strangely enough he appointed
Minh as chief of state.

General Kanh was for expanding

the war to North Vietnam and General Ky, head of the air
force, said that South Vietnamese pilots were being trained
for air attacks against the North.

General Westmoreland

took over the command of American forces from General
Harkins and on 27 July additional American military advisors
brought the total to twenty one thousand men.

The stage

was set for the introduction of American ground forces
into Vietnam.

1 3 4R. R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution: A
Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800 (Princeton,
N.J., 1959), p. 121 cited in McAlister, Vietnam, p. 364.
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The event that touched off this next stage of the
war was an incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.

What happened

is still being debated, but at the time there was little
question in the minds of Congress or the American public.
On 2 August 1964, the American destroyer, Maddox, reported
that she had been fired on by North Vietnamese PT boats.
On 4 August both the Maddox and the Turner Joy reported that
they had been fired on.

The latter reports were difficult

to confirm since the attacks had occurred at night and
even the radar sightings did not verify the attacks.
America retaliated with massive air attacks against North
Vietnam.

In Congress President Johnson pushed through the

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which gave him almost unlimited
authority to take any action he wished in Vietnam.

There

was no opposition in the House of Representatives to the
Resolution; in the Senate two voted against the measure-Senators Morse of Oregon and Gruening of Alaska.

135

The United States asked the United Nations Security
Council to investigate the attacks on America ships in the
Gulf of Tonkin but no resolutions were adopted.

In the

legal brief written by the State Department, the government
rationalized its actions by quoting from the United Nations
Charter and interpreting it to serve the interests of the

l35Buttinger, Vietnam, p. 483; Cooper, The Lost
Crusade, pp. 243-244.

Administration.

It also justified America's actions under

the Geneva Accords, but it neglected to mention that neither
country signed them.

The Joint Resolution of Congress of

10 August 1964, authorized American participation in the
collective defense of South Vietnam; it also gave the
President the right to resist further aggression with the
use of armed troops.

A declaration of war was not needed

because on two occasions Congress had appropriated further
funds backing up the resolution.136

The legal brief was

simply a means to justify the state's actions.
larger question arises than mere legality:

But a

if the Supreme

Court declared war to be constitutional, would an unjust
war be turned into a just one?

Richard Rovere, a strong

critic of the war writing in the New Yorker, observed,
"The rhetoric of politics is always opportunistic.

But

war, which debases all discourse, makes it worse. 1 37
The rhetoric from Washington which followed the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in the next years of the war
made an intelligent exchange of viewpoints between advocates
and critics of the war difficult.

In addition to increasing

troop strength to 180,000 by the end of 1965, Johnson and

1 3 6 state Department Legal Brief, pp. 2-15.
l37Richard Rovere, !!Reflections: Half Out of Our
Tree,1 1 New Yorker, (Oct. 28, 1967), 66. Hereafter cited
as Rovere, "Reflections".
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Premier Nguyen Cao Ky launched massive air attacks against
the North.

Raids were conducted against strategic barracks

and staging areas in the southern portion of North Vietnam.
Bombing was also used to curtail infiltration along the
Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.

According to a White House

statement issued on 7 February 1965, these retaliatory
attacks were prompted by surprise attacks on South Vietnamese
airfields and villages.

!I

attacks were made possible

by the continuing infiltration of personnel and equipment
from North Viet-Nam. 111 3 8
Escalation of the war continued through 1966.

More

troops were sent to South Vietnam and bombing of the North
was extended to the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong.
Justification for the bombing extension was that the North
Vietnamese were increasingly infiltrating into South
Vietnam.139

But further American involvement was to come.

In a speech given in Baltimore in April of 1965, President
Johnson said, 11 The confused nature of this conflict cannot
mask the fact that it is the face of an old enemy . .
The 'wars of liberation' strategy is at this time an essential
element of the expansionist policy of Communist China and

1 3 8senate Foreign Relations Report, p. 155. White
House Statement, 7 February 1965.
l39cooper, The Lost Crusade, p. 496.
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her Asian ally, North Viet-Nam." 1 40

Officially views

changed little from the earlier years.

Instead of the

large scale wars of major powers, these powers would encourage
small countries to fight small guerilla wars and wear down
the opposing major power.
How did North Vietnam view the war?

Premier Pham

Van Dong predicted in 1967 that North Vietnam would win the
war because America had failed to destroy the National
Liberation Front and extend the pacified area in South
Vietnam.

He believed that North Vietnam had a number of

advantages over America:

the North had better trained and

more experienced leadership for this type of war, they
were fighting on their own terrain among their own people
while the rapid rotation of American forces resulted in
a lack of familiarity with local and tropical conditions.
In addition the strain on the American economy of trying to
supply a war thousands of miles from home, and the unreliability of the South Vietnamese Army gave the North Vietnamese
further hope of victory.141
In the guerilla action of Vietnam, it was often
difficult to determine which side, if any, was winning.

A

140 u.s. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Outline:
Speech by President Johnson, 7 April 1965.
(Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 3.
141 Denis Warner, "How Hanoi Sees the War," The
Reporter, (August 1967), 17-20. Hereafter cited Warner,
"How Hanoi Sees the War".
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village that had been taken by American or South Vietnamese
troops might revert to Communist control only hours after
the other side moved out.

In an effort to show that

someone was winning, both sides initiated the body count.
General Giap believed that war could be won by the destruction
of enemy manpower so mobile war was important in this respect.
One source believed that North Vietnam was willing to accept
a casualty rate of from twenty-five to forty percent. 1 4 2
Richard Rovere stated the problem in a form more pictorial
than the statistics of body counts.
For Ho's generals, given their view of the war and
its role in nation-building, the outlook may seem anything but discouraging.
In North Vietnam alone, about
two hundred thousand young men reach military age
each year.
. if we accept as reasonably accurate
the figures our government asks us to accept, the
most we have been able to do is remove from combat
by killing, by wounding, by capturing -- something less
than half that number.
This, of course, includes
guerillas recruited in the South and it almost certainly
included some noncombatants. But even if the figures
were double of what the Pentagon claims, and even if
we faced no adversaries except the North Vietnamese
regulars, Hanoi would have each year a surplus of at
least one hundred thousand -- and an accumulated
surplus many times that large.143
The numbers of North Vietnamese willing to sacrifice
themselves for their country was large.

There were defections

from the army but most of them came from the Viet Cong

142 warner, "How Hanoi Sees the War," p. 18.
143 Richard Rovere, Waist Deep in the Big Muddy:
Personal Reflections (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Co.,
1967), pp. 105-106.
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impressed into service.

The well-trained and disciplined

North Vietnamese did not have this defection rate.

American

bombing has apparently not softened North Vietnamese resolve.
In a speech to the National Assembly in April of 1966, Ho
Chi Minh warned his country and the rest of the world:
Although our fight will be long and hard our people
are resolved to fight till final victory. Our people
cherish peace, but genuine peace can only be achieved
where there is real independence and freedom.
Our
people are a heroic people; we are resolved to fight
till complete victory to achieve real peace, independence
and freedom.144
During 1968 both sides subtly hinted that they were
open to the possibility of peace talks.

North Vietnam

demanded that America stop the bombing before it would
discuss peace.

South Vietnam demanded that she should have

the central role in any peace moves and should initiate
such a move.

America demanded that North Vietnam not increase

its infiltration of men and supplies beyond normal and
current levels. 14 5

On 10 May 1968, President Johnson

announced that American would meet in Paris with Hanoi's
representatives to discuss any peace moves.

Involved in

these talks were the United States, South Vietnam, North
Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

14 4Ho Chi Minh, "Speech to National Assembly," in
Ho Chi Minh on Revolution:
Selected Writings, Bernard Fall,
ed., (New York, Washington, London: Frederick A. Praeger,
1967), p. 377,
145 cooper, The Lost Crusade, pp. 514-520.
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There was much disagreement between the two Vietnams over
the participation of the NLF.

On October 31 Johnson

announced the end of the bombing of North Vietnam.

Even as

he prepared for peace talks, Johnson issued warnings to
North Vietnam.
I can tell you that a series of hopeful
events has occurred in South Vietnam. The Government of
South Viet-Nam has grown steadily stronger. South
Vietnam's armed forced have been substantially increased
to the point where a million men are tonight under arms,
and the effectiveness of these men has steadily improved.
The superb performance of our own men, under the
brilliant leadership of General Westmoreland and
General Abrams, has produced truly remarkable results.146
The years since the election of Richard Nixon in
November of 1968 have just passed into history.

The time

perspective is short, the air and the rhetoric are emotion
charged, and most documents are not readily available to
the historian.
made however.

There are some observations that can be
President Nixon has continued to reduce

troop strength in Vietnam since his term began.

A second

point to be noted is the extension of the war from Vietnam
into Cambodia and Laos.
Indochina War.

The Vietnam War became the second

The Indochinese Revolutionary Front came

into being on April 24 and 25 when the North Vietnamese Lao
Dong, the Pathet Lao, the South Vietnamese National Liberation

146 Lyndon B. Johnson, Vietnam: The Struggle to be
Free (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 107.
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Front and Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia met to confirm their
solidarity in a common cause.

On April 30th American

troops entered Laos.147
According to a French expert who witnessed the
downfall of French colonialism and the frustration of
American might, Nixon's invasion of Laos and Cambodia
was suicidal.

General Giap insisted that every extension

of the field on battle served revolutionary interests for
it was in the interest of those with heavy fire-power to
concentrate the fighting.

The operation of April 30th was

a contribution to the revolutionary reunification of old
colonial Indochina.148
The conflict between myth and reality increases
as the historian approaches the present.

What is reality

in this eighth decade of the twentieth century?

America

and South Vietnam oppose North Vietnam in a power struggle
that has its roots buried deep in nationalism.

It is

difficult to predict what will happen in Vietnam, but
it is apparent that American involvement is decreasing.
Whatever happens in Vietnam, the people will decide, for in
this sense it is the peoples' war.

The rice paddy farmer,

14 7Jean LaCouture, "From the Vietnam War to An
Indochina War," Foreign Affairs, XLVIII (July 1970), 617.
148 Ibid., pp. 627-628.
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the shopkeeper, the soldier, the artisan, are all a part
of the spirit of Vietnam.

If the leaders of the North have

truly aroused the spirit of the people, then this spirit
cannot be ignored, smothered, or bombed into submission
according to Hegel.
gloomy.

The case for South Vietnam is more

The leaders of the South cannot hope to arouse

the spirit of the South Vietnamese unless they extend reforms
to the level where the people will benefit.

CHAPTER VI
HEGEL AGAIN
Hegel's philosophy of politics and history did not deal
with specific issues or battles.

He mentioned wars between

Persia and Greece and between Greece and Rome but only in general
terms.

Each of these wars indicated a decline of one nation

and the rise of another.

Specific wars were treated lightly

in his philosophy of history and individual battles and problems
were not treated at all.

Before dealing with perspectives of

Vietnam from the Hegelian view, it is necessary to understand
Hegel's attitude towards war in general.
The battle in Hegel's mind between the real and the
ideal is nowhere better illustrated than in his attitude towards
war.

War was a part of reality but ideally war would disappear

as man developed his ability to reason.

Hegel viewed war in

the philosophical sense as a necessity rather than an accident,
for it was necessary to establish that property and life were
not permanent features on earth.

The finite characteristics

of life and property could be abolished by war.
War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil and as
a purely external accident, which itself therefore has
some external cause be it injustices, the passions of
nations or the holders of power, &c., or in short, something or other which ought not to be.
It is to what is
by nature accidental that accidents happen, and the fate
whereby they happen is thus a necessity . . . . the point
of view from which things seem pure accidents vanishes
if we look at them in the light of the concept and philosophy, because philosophy knows accident for a show and
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sees in it its essence, necessity.
It is necessary
that the finite--property and life--should be definitely
established as accidental, because accidentality is the
concept of the finite. 14 9
Hegel saw in war some good features and some bad features.

War

was good in that it made man realize how temporal life and
property was.

It emphasized the eternity of ideas as compared

to the ephemeral nature of material goods.
We hear plenty of sermons from the pulpit about the
insecurity, vanity and instability of temporal things,
but everyone thinks however much he is removed by what
he hears, that he at least will be able to retain his
own. But if this insecurity now comes on the scene in
the form of hussars with shining sabres and they actualize
in real earnest what the preachers have said, the moving
and edifying discourses which foreto1~ ~11 these events
turn into curses against the invader. 5
There were several philosophical concepts of war that
Hegel realized might be good.
within a country.

"

War might clear away stagnation

. just as the blowing of the winds

preserves the sea from foulness which would be the result of
a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations, would be the
result of a prolonged, let alone perpetual peace."
were practical concerns of war also:

151

There

when states disagreed

the only way to solve the disagreement was by war.

In war

states build their identity, for it was necessary to recognize

14 9Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 209.
150 Ibid., pp. 295-296.
151

Ibid., p. 210.
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a nation in order to fight with it.

The struggle for formal

recognition was the beginning of a nation's history.

In the

practical concerns of war there was no right reason or wrong
reason.

11

matter:

not which of the two rights is the more right, for

And war, or any other means what will decide the

both sides have equal rights--but which of the rights will
yield to the other. 111 5 2
Hegel did not attempt to justify a concrete war, a
war in particular, by his philosophical scheme.

Concrete wars

were often fought over individual desires, national passions,
or even guessing the intentions of another power.

The rulers

within the state did not see what the universal concerns were,
but only the destruction of their own particular desires if
they did not force the issue with another nation.
Its (state) government, therefore is a matter of particular wisdom, not of universal Providence . . • . its aims
in relation to other states and its principle for justifying wars and treaties is not a universal thought (the
thought of philanthropy) but only its actually injured
or threate~~d welfare as something specific and peculiar
to itself. Jj
It would be difficult to justify the Vietnam War or any
other war on the basis of Hegel's philosophy.

Philosophically

war may have some good points according to Hegel:

states may

identify and consolidate themselves, national spirit may be

152 Avineri, "The Problem of War," p. 471.
153 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp. 214-215.
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revived by definding one's country, and above all, the vanity
of temporal things is realized.

Hegel's desire for a unified

German state is apparent in the Philosophy of Right, but it
would be unrealistic to call him a nationalist.

In a concrete

or particular war the only justification is that it is the
will of a particular man or nation:
of a universal plan.

it is not necessarily part

It was the will of America to contain

Communism, and Vietnam was one region that seemed threatened.
In the world of reality Hegel would say that America and North
Vietnam had equal rights so the only question was which of the
rights would yield to the other.

In the ideal world Hegel

believed that war might pass away.
War is a part of history for it arises from the social
conditions in which man lives.

Hegel was careful to separate

the state from civil society and the duties of the citizen in
the state and civil society.
Hence in war, war itself is characterized as something
which ought to pass away.
. possibility of peace be
retained . . . , in general, that war be not waged against
the peace of family and pr ~te life, or against persons
in their private capacity.

15

Hegel regarded war as a part of history, but he did not regard
war as inevitable or lasting, nor did he attempt to defend any
war.

His intention was to explain war conceptually.

Hegel

believed that wars should be humanely waged and ideally they

l54Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 215.
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would not involve the private citizen.

Anything which involved

less emotional drain on the individual would be good, for he
noted that the invention of gunpowder made battle more anonymous.
Shooting someone evidently involved less emotional contact than
lopping off another man's head with a sword.

One might wonder

how Hegel would view modern warfare with its long range missiles
and automated weapons.

In Vietnam the citizen is directly in-

volved in the war for he is frequently an object of concern for
both sides.

The conflict in Vietnam is not a battle for terri-

tory between professional armies but a battle for the hearts
and minds of its citizens.

Hegel might have changed his views

if he had lived in the twentieth century.
The problem of war between nations in light of Hegel's
philosophy has been discussed. 155

Some experts in Washington

did not believe that the Vietnam conflict could be viewed in
the same light as, for example, the Korean War.

Many believed

that the problems in Vietnam were civil problems that must be
resolved by competing factions within the country.

Hegel noted

that nations have no business meddling in the internal affairs
of another.

"The legitimate authority of a state and, more

particularly, so far as its foreign relations are concerned,
of its monarch also, is partly a purely domestic matter (one

155 see pages 97-99.
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state should not meddle with the domestic affairs of another)." 156
If the Vietnam conflict is truly a civil war, then Hegel would
argue that America was not justified in intervention.
It has also been pointed out that many Vietnamese view
American participation in the political and military life of
Vietnam as an extension of French imperialism.

The government

of North Vietnam has extended political and land reforms so
that average people in the North have benefited.

The series

of military dictatorships of South Vietnam have not been able
to do this successfully.

The North has done the most to arouse

the spirit of their people and involve them in the concerns of
their country.

Hegel observed that a monarch that imposes him-

self on a people must expect to have trouble.
If then the monarch comes on the scene as the head and
a part of the constitution, we are compelled to hold that
there is no constitutional identity between a conquered
people and its prince. A rebellion in a province conquered
in war is a different thing from a rising in a well-organized
state.
It is not against their prince that the conquered
are in rebellion, and they are committing no crime against
the state, because their connexion with their master is
not a connexion within the Idea or one within the inner
necessity of the constitution.
In ~vch a case, there is
only a contract, no political tie. 1
The authority imposed by the French and later, the Americans,
has been imposed from above and not involved the average person
in the life of the state.

Hegel would view the uprisings of

156 Hegel, Philosophy or Right, p. 213.
157 Ibid., p. 289.
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the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong as perfectly justified.

The

ideal state, according to Hegel, would be based on the will
of the people developed over a long period of time.
The State, its laws, it arrangements, constitute the
rights of its members; its natural features, its mountains,
air and waters, are their country, their fatherland, their
outward material property; their history of this State,
their deeds; what their ancestors have produced, belongs
to them and lives in their memory. All is their possession, just as they are possesi~~ by it; for it constitutes
their existence, their being.
Thus in the Hegelian view Diem, Kanh, Thieu and Ky do not represent the spirit of Vietnam but the imperialism of France
and America.
One is reminded of another conflict between a great
empire and a small state in Hegel's discussion of the Persian
Wars.

He described the ancient conflict between Greece and

Persia.
In the history of the world it is not the formal (subjective and individual) valor that has been displayed,
not the so-called merit of the combatants, but the importance of the cause itself, that must decide the fame
of the achievment.
In the case before us, the interest
of the World's History hung trembling in the balance.
Oriental despotism--a world united under one lord and
sovereign--on the one side, and separate states--insignificant in extent and resources, but animated by free
individuality--on the other side, stood front to front
in array of battle. Never in history has the superiority
of spiritual power over material bulk--and that no contemptible amount--been so gloriously manifest. 1 59

l58Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 52.
l59Ibid., pp. 257-258.

104
In this case one must ignore Hegel's oriental despotism
for it is not really applicable in the twentieth century.

If

one substituted for the spirit of individuality, Vietnam, and
for the nation of material bulk and strength, America, then
Hegel's description is of value.

The spiritual power in Viet-

nam arises from its determination to free itself from foreign
influence.

Hegel had an advantage in that he knew that Persia

declined and Greece became the new world historical people.
The history of American involvement in Vietnam is not complete,
but if one equates retreat with defeat, then America could
follow the same course as the Persian Empire.

Hegel was care-

ful not to predict however.
An international agency to regulate conflict between
nations was put forth by Kant, Hegel's philosophical predecessor.
But Hegel's attitude towards international law remained pessimistic, and perhaps was the more realistic of the two views.
Hegel recognized that each state was sovereign and that "welfare
is the highest law governing the relation of one state to
another." 160

Whatever the state decided was right for a parti-

cular condition was right for that state.

Hegel did mention a

system of international law, but it did not go beyond an oughtto-be and had no power to enforce.

160 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 214.
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There is no Praetor to judge between states, at best
there may be an arbitrator or a mediator, and even he
exercises his functions contingently only, i.e., in
dependence on the particular wills of the disputants.
Kant had an idea for securing 'perpetual peace' by a
League of Nations to adjust every dispute.
It was to
be a power recognized by each individual state, and
was to arbitrate in all cases of dissension in order to
settle them . . . . this would rest ~~ moral or religious
1
or other grounds and considerations.
Morality and religious ethics were needed to guide individuals
within a civil society, but they had little reality in international relations.

Hegel seemed to accept the fact that

contingency was the main idea governing relations between states.
This was the world of reality, the world as it really was.

Only

history could judge what was right for the history of the world
was the world's court of judgement.
On the other hand, some Hegelian experts believe they
have detected Hegel's idealism in his attitude towards an
international peace keeping force.

Avineri felt that Hegel

believed that the trend of states was towards uniformity and
that the chasm between European states of Hegel's day was not
as great as the gulf between Persia and Greece at the time of
the Persian Wars.

Avineri felt that Hegel would not approve

of an international system that used force to keep peace.
Ideally the nations of the world would be held together by
162
cultural ties rather than political force.

161

Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 23.

162 Avineri, "The Problem of War," p. 473,
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The United Nations has done little to bring about a settlement
in Vietnam for they have no power to bind nations by political
agreement or force.

Perhaps Hegel's views on international

law are still valid for an agreement that kept political units
in harmony because of cultural similarities would be more
effective than a system which held nations together by force.
Hegel viewed all of history as a process of the development of the dialectic.

Although the Vietnam War has lasted

only a few years as compared to the larger time spans that
Hegel viewed, the Hegelian dialectical process in Vietnam is
a microcosm of a larger historical development.

In the early

stages of the French War, American leaders did not want to
become involved in Vietnam.

European concerns were more

important than a small Asian country.

Yet America found her-

self granting aid to France in return for French backing on
the EDC treaty.

When French troops were defeated at Dien

Bien Phu, America became concerned about the containment of
Communism in Vietnam as well as in Europe.

Hegel's comment

on the dialectic accurately describes the state of American
diplomacy at this point.

"The contradiction which the arbi-

trary will is, comes into appearance as a dialectic of impulses
and inclinations; each of them is in the way of every other-the satisfaction of one is unavoidably subordinated or sacrificed
to the satisfaction of another, and so on. 11163

163Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 28.
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became a conflict of choices between several possibilities,
and there was some indecision as to which possibility was
the most desirable for America.
The Geneva Convention marked the beginning of a second
phase in America's involvement in Vietnam.

Now America recog-

nized the partition of Vietnam and the government of the South
as that government which most closely embodied its own principles.
Steps were taken to aid this government so a new spirit replaced
the old spirit of nonintervention.

Hegel described such a pro-

cess as this in the Phenomenology; in this case he was referring
to the French Revolution, but his ideas can also apply to the
course of American involvement in Vietnam.
The spirit of man has broken with the old order of
things hitherto prevailing, and with the old ways of
thinking, and is the mind to let them sink into the
depths of the past and to set about its own transformation.
. Here as in the case of the birth of a
child; after a long period of nutrition in silence, the
continuity of the gradual growth in size, of quantative
change, is suddenly cut short by the first drawn breath-there is a break in the process, a qualitative change-and the child is born.
In like manner the spirit of the
time, growing slowly and quietly ripe for the new form
it is to assume, disintegrates one fragment after another
of its previous world . . . . but this new world is perfectly realized just as little as the newborn child; .
It comes on the stage in its bare generality.lb4
During the ten years following the Geneva Convention, America
found herself giving more support to the South Vietnamese government.

Propaganda was formulated in order to show the accomplish-

ments of the various military governments and how each was

164

Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 75.
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striving to become a model democracy.
Then in August of 1964 America entered a third phase
of involvement with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

American

troops were actively involved in combat, and American planes
bombed North Vietnam.

Again, "The spirit of man has broken

with the old order of things hitherto prevailing . . . • " 165
The American ideal of the containment of Communism increased
just as a fruit increases in size until it is ripe.

Just as

the over-ripe fruit withers and dies, Americats ideal of the
containment of Communism in Vietnam withered and died when it
became apparent that large amounts of men and material would
not accomplish this purpose.

America's "glorious dreams are

destroyed by cold actuality.

These ideals--which in the voy-

age of life founder on the rocks of hard reality--may be in
the first instance only subjective, and belong to the idiosyncracy of the individual imagining himself to be highest
and wisest.

11166

The hard reality in Vietnam is that the containment of
Communism for American citizens has not aroused the same spirit
as political independence has for Vietnamese citizens.

The

spirit of nationalism among most Vietnamese is stronger than
the spirit of containment among most Americans.

l65Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 75,
166 Hegel, Philosophy of H~~tory, p. 35,
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of Hegel's dialectical process will be complete when the
last American soldier leaves Vietnam.

In the language of

the Hegelian logic 'Being', America in Vietnam, contained
within itself the seeds for destruction or 'Negation'.
tion would be American troops leaving Vietnam.

Nega-

As the two

processes worked in opposition to each other, the process of
'Becoming' was observed.

This process of 'Becoming' Hegel

viewed as history.
Could America have changed the course of its history
at any point in its involvement?

A great man in America

might have altered the course of history, yet no great man
appeared.

In a Hegelian view, the times demanded a Ceasar,

an Alexander, a Napoleon, instead of the lukewarm actions
and reactions of American leaders.

It has been illustrated

that South Vietnam possessed no great man either.

The man

who has come the closest to sensing the needs of the times
and the spirit of his people is Ho Chi Minh.

Hegel's des-

scription of a hero in history is applicable to Ho.
They may be called Heroes, inasmuch as they have
derived their purposes and their vocation, not from
the calm, regular course of things, sanctioned by the
existing order; but from a concealed fount--one which
has not attained to phenomenal present existence--from
that inner Spirit, still hidden beneath the surface,
which, impringing on the outer world as on a shell bursts
it in pieces, because it is another kernal than that
which belonged to the shell in question.
They are
men, therefore, who appear to draw the impulse of life
from themselves . . . . Such individuals had no consciousness of the general Idea they were unfolding, while prosecuting those aims of theirs; on the contrary, they
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were thinking men, who had insight into the
quirements
of the time--what was ripe for development. 167
One usually envisions a great man as Napoleon or Ceasar leading
their legions into battle, not as a guerilla living in the
jungles of Asia.

But no one can deny that he was a practical,

political man who knew what was ripe for development.

Perhaps

Ho will be the model for the Hegelian hero of the future.
Hegel believed in the perfectibility of man and that,
in turn, implies that men and nations can change and profit
from their mistakes.

"This peculiarity in the world of mind

has indicated in the case of man an altogether different
destiny from that of merely natural objects.

. namely a

real capacity for change, and that for the better--an impulse
of perfectibility. 11168

One need not view history as a cyclical

process in order to profit from the lessons of history.

What

lessons can America learn from other civilizations that can
help her put the Vietnam conflict in perspective?

The most

obvious lesson would be from the histories of Greece and Rome.
In the second phase of the development of a world historical
people, the period of prosperity and independence, both Greece
and Rome extended their empires through conquest.

Internal

dissension followed wars of conquest and the empires were torn

167 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 30.
168

Ibid., p. 54.
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apart from within.

America is in this second stage of deve-

lopment for she became the world historical nation after the
defeat of Germany in World War I.

America exists in a different

time and has different problems from those that faced other
great empires.

But if one accepts Hegel's observation of the

organic birth and death of other nations, then America will
decline.

The policies and attitudes that made her strong are

also capable of leading to her downfall.

But Hegel had great

hopes for the New World for he believed that the burden of
history would reveal itself here.

He did not predict America's

eventual decline, but, instead, he seemed to view America as
a land of refuge and hope.

Perhaps America can improve itself

and change its course of action in its search for perfectibility.
Perfectibility to Hegel would be consciousness of reason in the
state and in the individual conscience.
Hegel believed that war provided contact between world
historical peoples, but it is difficult to conceive of Vietnam
as the next world historical nation.

The conflict has caused

the North Vietnamese to strengthen their resolve to liberate
their country, but it is doubtful if they wish to become a
powerful empire.

Perhaps the spirit of individuality that

they have shown will eventually lead to a federation of Asian
states.

This federation has been suggested by LaCouture when

he noted the formation of the Indochinese Revolutionary Front.
It would also be in the Hegelian spirit for Hegel believed that
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the best way to avoid conflict would be the voluntary association of nations having common interests and cultures.
Internal problems in America have come to the front
during the latter years of the Vietnam War.

While these inter-

nal problems have not reached the magnitude of those faced by
Greece or Rome, they are valuable in that force a nation to
re-evaluate its basic beliefs.

These problems are difficult

to comprehend for they are set in the realm of philosophy
rather than history or science.

Because the spirit of freedom

is so strong in America, many citizens consider themselves as
experts in affairs where they have no experience or training.
Because individual conscience is so strongly developed, many
young men object to fighting in a war in which they do not
believe.

Because the members of Congress consider themselves

to be the voice of the people, there is constant conflict
between its members.
The role of public opinion in a democracy is difficult
to measure.

In Hegel's time news was spread by the written

word; during the present time, radio and television have supplemented newspapers and periodicals as sources of information.
Battle scenes are fought practically every night in the American
living room.

Citizens are exposed to scenes of executions, of

American soldiers lopping off the ears of enemy dead, of
children lying in ditches.

The average man can now see war

as a horror that could formerly be viewed only by being there.
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In spite of the difference in time there is much in Hegel's
philosophy or theory of state that can enable the present day
historian to view internal conflict in a more realistic light.
Hegel's point of view will show one that human nature is much
the same today as it was in Hegel's time.
One must look more closely at Hegel's theory of state
to see how he viewed society.

He is sometimes attacked for his

political conservatism, for his philosophy of "might makes right".
Few of Hegel's readers realized that he was discussing an ideal
state and not the German state that existed during his lifetime.
T. M. Knox, one of Hegel's translators, saw his Philos~phy of
Right as an invitation to statesmen to reform the state in
accordance with the principles laid down in the Philosophy.
Some of these principles were actually at work in the state
but not a11. 169

The second point that needs investigation is

the "might makes right" concept that Hegel has been saddled
with.

The history of the world was not the realization of force

or might but the realization of the mind--the triumph of reason.
The last paragraph of his Philosophy

or

H~story most aptly states

his position.
That the History of the World, with all the changing
scenes which its annals present, is this process of development and the realization of Spirit--this is the true
Theodicaea, the justification of God in History. Only

16 9T. M. Knox, "Hegel and Prussianism," in Kaufmann,
ed., Political Philosophy, p. 23.
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this insight can reconcile Spirit with the History of
the World--viz., that what has happened and is happening
every day, is no gnly not "without God," but is essentially His Work. 17
Hegel rs God in this quotation was not the God of the
Christian Bible, but the conscious development of man's spirit.
Man's spirit was awakening from its state of nature and was
developing its ability to reason, to become godlike.

The pro-

gress of history was only the development of reason; history's
temporary setbacks were merely the work of the 'cunning of
reason'.

Set against this background of a desire for an ideal

state how would Hegel view demonstrations that questioned the
policy making decisions of a state?
The relationship between the state and the individual
was the critical point in understanding a citizen's rights and
duties.

For Hegel, "The State is the actuality of the ethical

Idea '.'171 The state "has supreme right against the indi victual,
whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state. 11172

But.

this duty to the state was not a duty imposed from above but
a duty that grew out of the collective will and history of a
people.

The right to be a citizen and the duties of a citizen

170 Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 457.
1 7 1 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 155.
l7 2 Ibid.
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were bound in the same idea.

Patriotism to Hegel was more

than a volition which had become habitual; it was a trust
that the individual's interest was contained and preserved
in another's interest.
Patriotism is often understood to mean only a readiness
for exceptional sacrifices and actions. Essentially,
however, it is the sentiment which, in the relationships
of our daily life and under ordinary conditions, habitually
recognizes that the community is one's substantive ground
work and end.
It is out of this consciousness, which
during life's daily round stands the test in all circumstances, that there subsequently also arises the readiness
for extraordinary exertions. But since men would often
rather be magnanimous than law-abiding, they readily persuade themselves that they possess this exceptional patriotism in order to be sparing in the expression of a
nuine
patriotic sentiment or to excuse their lack of it. 113
Patriotism to Hegel did not mean an extraordinary sacrifice of
one's life or limb, but a day to day devotion to community and
fellow citizens.

The conscience of the individual was left

room for development for Hegel considered man capable of rational
and as patriotic as giving one's life for one's country.
Individuals in time of peace were permitted to go their
own way and satisfy their particular aims.

In time of emergency

the will of individuals must become one with the state for in
the state the individual finds his particular interest.
In times of peace, the particular spheres and functions
pursue the path of satisfying their particular aims and
minding their own business, and it is in part only by way
of the unconscious necessity of the thing that their selfseeking is turned into a contribution to reciprocal suppor½

l73Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 164.
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and to the support of the whole .
In a situation
of exigency, however, whether in home or foreign affairs,
the organism of which these particular spheres ar, mem4
bers fuses into a single concept of sovereignty.
The citizen's duty became directed to the nation or
community of individuals rather than to his own private concerns during time of crisis.

This was not necessarily a con-

servative position, but a position which one could easily find
among present day democrats.
statement in 1967:

Eugene Rostow made the following

"The problem, however, is not feelings

alone but thought and whether in the end reflection will dominate
feeling in the formation of policy.

• that as the privileges

of democracy are always great, so too, are its duties sometimes
stern. 11175
In the legislature where men are trained and knowledgeable in the business of the state, public opinion becomes important.

Legislators can learn of ideas that are circulating

in common life from public opinion surveys and, in turn, the
average man can learn from the legislator.

Opinion was a basic

right for each individual for it was a part of his subjective
freedom.

Hegel's views might be used today if politicians

were aware of them.

174 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 181.
1 75u.s. Department of State, "American Security in An
Unstable World," Eugene V. Rostow (Washington:
Government
Printing Office, 1967), pp. 8-9.
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Public opinion, therefore, is a repository not only
of the genuine needs and correct tendencies of common
life, but also, in the form of common sense, of the
eternal, substantive principle of justice, the true
content and result of legislation, the whole constitution, and the general position of the state . • . . it
(public affairs) becomes infected by all the accidents
of opinion, by its ignorance and p iersity, by its
mistakes and falsity of judgement.

17

The dialectic was evident when Hegel discussed public
opinion:

it was a source of truth and endless error.

"The

passion with which an opinion is urged or the seriousness with
which it is maintained or attacked and disputed is no criterion
of its real contant;

.

11177

Public opinion should be

despised for its concrete content is not truth; it should be
respected for the fact that it is the substantive will of the
people, but it is not knowledge.

Should national leaders

listen to public opinion and follow its advice?
believe so:

Hegel did not

to be independent of public opinion was the first

prerequisite for attaining anything great in life or in science.
The great man would sense what was ripe for development and
use it to achieve great triumphs in life; in return the public
would recognize great achievements and applaud them.
In view of Hegel's philosophy, the leader did not have
to submit to the will of the public.

Hegel lived in another era

1 7 6 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 204.
l7 7Ibid., p. 205.

178 Ibid.
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and in a different kind of soniety.

He believed that democracy

was more advanced than an aristocracy but it definitely was
not as advanced as an enlightened monarchy.

Hegel did not

consider America a real state when he wrote his political
views so it is difficult to predict what kind of government
he would expect in the New World.

He did not recognize the

American government as either a democracy or monarchy.

He

did foresee trouble in the New World for he predicted a race
war between North and South America.

Hegel's monarch was a

truly great man who was above the worldly and mundane matters
of the common man.

He could see what was truly good for his

country and his people.

Hegel saw aristocracy and democracy

in the light of his dialectic, for when he discussed the Roman
state he noted:
This opposition begins in the clash between the substantial intuition of an aristocracy and the principle
of free personality in democratic form.
As the opposition
grows, the first of these opponents develops into superstitution and the maintenance of heartless self-seeking
power, while the second becom
more and more corrupt
until it sinks into a rabble. 179
Hegel was extremely skeptical of rule by the masses;
perhaps the results of the French Revolution pointed out the
terrors of any mob action.

To Hegel an enlightened monarchy

would provide the stability necessary for society.

Since the

days of Plato there have been those who wished for their country
to be governed by a philosopher-king rather than a man who has

l79Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 221
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convinced the common man that he is right.
Hegel would probably disapprove of the American political system as its exists today.

He would dislike conventions,

campaign oratory, war moratoriums simply because too much was
based on feeling and not enough on reason.
man of action as well as thought.

But Hegel was a

In the real world he re-

spected men, movements, and countries that succeeded.

"But

so mighty a form must trample down many an innocent flower-crust to pieces many an object in its path. 11180

Hegel would

probably approve of the American system because it was successful even if he did not approve of her political policies.

He

would also warn that the thoughtful processes that built
America might also destroy it.

The concepts of American demo-

cracy might not work so well if they were imposed on a foreign
nation such as Vietnam.
Civil liberties were an important concept to Hegel.
Freedom of the press and of the spoken word were essential
rights in a society.

Free speech was harmless because the

government was stable, the constitution was rational, and
the legislature effectively aired public opinion.

A further

comment by Hegel could be a basic tenet of a contemporary
democrat.

180

"A further safeguard of free speech is the indifference

Hegel, Philosophy bf History, p. 32.
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and contempt speedily and necessarily visited on shallow and
cantankerous talking. 11181

Hegel qualified his statement by

noting that conditions or circumstances at the time would
determine whatever action to be taken.
Apart from this, however, as I said now, the element
in wnich views and their expression become principles
and opinions of others. Hence this aspect of these
actions, i.e., their effectiveness proper and their
danger to individuals, society and the state depends on
the character of the ground on which they fall, just as
a spark falling on a heap of gunpowder is more dangerous
than if it falls on hard ground where it vanishes without
a trace. 1 ~ 2
There has been much comment on draft resistors during
the Vietnam War; there has also been discussion within the
legislature over the continuation of the draft and who should
be included in draft calls.

Many Americans view a young man's

refusal to enlist at his country's calling as a lack of patriotism.

The Vietnam War has brought the draft dodger and the

conscientious objector once more into the public eye.

The

Supreme Court ruled that a person no longer needs to be a
member of a particular religion in order to qualify for objector
status.

Hegel probably would agree with this decision for he

saw religion based much more on morality than on dogma.

"He

(Jesus) undertook to raise religion and virtue to morality and
183
to restore to morality the freedom which is its essence."
The

181

Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 207,

182 Ibid.
18 3Hegel, Christianity, p. 69.
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essential tenet of Christianity was to un~te man's natural
instincts into morality.

Even if a man did not subscribe

to a recognized religion, he might have all the inward qualities
of religion and qualify as a conscientious objector.
The refusal to take up arms for one's country is not
new and not unique to America.

In Hegel's Germany, Quakers,

Anabaptists, and other religious groups refused to fight in
their country's wars.

How did Hegel view these sects?

Tolera-

tion.
A state which is strong because its organization is
mature may be all the more liberal in this matter; it
may entirely overlook details of religious practice
which affect it, and may even tolerate a sect (though, of
course, all depends on its numbers) which on religious
grounds declines to recognize even its direct duties to
the state. 1 H4
The sect might perform some other service to the state that
was more passive in nature.

If the state is secure it can

tolerate these challenges to its authority.
Only if the state is other wise strong can it overlook
and suffer such anomalies, because it can rely principally
on the strength of custom and the inner rationality of
its institutions to diminish and close the gap between the
existence of a~§~alies and the full assertion of its own
strict rights.
America is secure and rational enough to overlook these
anomalies--religious or otherwise.

To remove a man's civil

rights would not bring these sects into public life but would
only confirm the isolation for which they have been reproached.

184 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 168.
18 5Ibid., pp. 168-169.
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It is better for the state to ignore these anomalies and hope
that they will in time contribute to the state in some other
way.

Possibly war was not the only circumstance where patrio-

tism could be shown.

Devotion to community and honorable

dealings with one's fellow man could be as patriotic as leading a charge up "Hamburger Hill".
In the legislature and in public life there is a tendency to fall into a set position or roll--the role of hawk
versus dove is a contemporary example.

Men who are broad

minded in other areas may become doctrinaire when they discuss
their country's role in foreign affairs.

Views in the legis-

lature have ranged from immediate withdrawal, with no excuses,
to a very militaristic solution--bombing of the North with
nuclear weapons.

In the last years of the war the last position

has been modified; the modification is due in part to public
opinion, the public outcry against the war.

Until now military

needs have received primary consideration:
186
tion to every kind of war.

now there is opposi-

The conflict within the legislature serves as an educative device for the average man.

There is also a chance for

members of the legislature to modify their own views, to evolve
within their own minds a change of policy.
man's mind evolved much as history evolved.

Hegel believed that
As man became con-

scious of his thoughts they evolved into a higher form--into

18 6Rovere, "Reflect iors," p . 7 4 •
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reason.

It is obvious that not all public officials have

learned to reason.

Even Hegel's detractors have found good

points in his philosophy.

Sidney Hook observed that con-

temporary conservatives and liberals could learn much from
Hegel:

they could observe his principles of continuity and

polarity and avoid lapses into doctrinaire positions.

He

observed that some liberals seem to want to wipe out all of
history and begin as if man were born yesterday.

From a,

careful study of Hegel, they might learn that no one principle
can guide all of human affairs even if the principle is a
glittering generality like freedom, peace, survival, justice,
love. 18 7

l87Sidney Hook, "Hegel Rehabilitated?", in Kaufmann,
ed., Political Philosophy, p. 63.

CHAPTER VII
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
There are many facets of the Vietnam War that do not
suit themselves to Hegel's ideas on history and politics.
Specific battles and policies were not discussed by Hegel.
This is a weak part of Hegel's system when it is applied
to practical situations.

Unlike theories of physical

science, theories of history are not as neat and as easy to
manipulate.

There always seem to be some facts which do

not fit in; this implies that the theory is not a correct
one.

Perhaps when man has reached the reliability and

consistency of nature, these theories, too, will be more
consistent.
Hegel's philosophy of politics was designed for a
monarchy, not a democracy.

His philosophy is not as liberal

as most American political philosophies today.

Even though

he advocated many policies liberal for his time, he
probably would not be included with today's liberals.
Hegel believed that there was much in human nature that
was cruel, self-seeking, irrational.

Man was not yet a

completely rational creature; that was the goal of world
history.

The common man was not capable of governing

himself for his knowledge was only subjective and had not
been submitted to reason.

Hegel might also be criticized
124
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for his lack of sympathy for cultures outside the sphere
of traditional western thought.

The Oriental world was

not looked upon with great favor, and Africa and South
America were ignored completely.

On the other hand, Hegel

advocated religious toleration.and acceptance of the Jewish
elements in German society.
Another aspect of Hegel's philosophy that is difficult
to reconcile with the twentieth century conflict is the
type of warfare that was waged in Hegel's time and is
being fought now.

Guerilla warfare fought amongst the

civilian population was not common in Hegel's time.

Enemies

were more clearly defined for they usually wore a uniform.
Pacification, Vietnamization, and their accompanying
concepts were not terms that would be very relevant in the
nineteenth century world.

Technology has also changed

warfare from personal hand-to-hand combat to more efficient
and far reaching methods such as air attacks and missiles.
But these are only minor stumbling blocks for the historian.
The greatest criticism that one can make of Hegel's
philosophy is that it is too general and is not well
documented.

The ambiguous nature of Hegel's writings is

frequently responsible for the wide range of views that
one finds among Hegelian experts.

If one treats Hegel as

an historian, then he has serious faults.

He failed to
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footnote his sources and only mentioned them in an offhand
way.

He frequently misquoted people or attributed one man's

quotations to another.

It is apparent that in many cases

Hegel was too lost in thought to take the time to check
what he was writing.

The historian Hegel might also be

taken to task for his idealism; he frequently wrote of
the world as he wished it to be and not as it really was.
As a historian Hegel should have been content with
reporting what actually happened.

But Hegel did not

publish much in the historical realm; the History of
Philosophy was the closest he came to a true history.
It was as a philosopher that Hegel won renown.

He

attempted to put his world in order by reflecting on the
course of history.

Hegel saw the world as it was, he

attempted to understand it, and then, he tried to show
how man

could create an ideal world by reason.

Even

though Hegel was well aware of man's weaknesses, he was
optimistic about man's future.

As a son of the Enlight-

enment he could not give up his belief in progress.

Hegel's

heaven would not be after death but in a future time on
earth when man's greed, avarice, and other natural evils
had been subdued by his mind.
The question of the perfectibility and Education
of the Human Race arises here. Those who have maintained
this perfectibility have divined something of the
nature of mind, something of the fact that it is its

127
nature to have Y #I w IJc.· <r E. o. V 'T 9"'
as the law
of its being, and since it apprehends that which it
is to have a higher form than that which constituted
its mere being.IS~
Optimism may be considered foolish by some elements in today's
world, but it is optimism and not pessimism that provides
the driving force behind achievement.
in abundance:

Hegel had optimism

rather than give up to the despair of "If

this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the rest
like?" he might have said, "since this is the only world we
have, how can we understand it better?"

The secrets of the

universe, including the workings of men's minds and of
history, should open to the gaze of the dedicated man.
Hegel is sometimes given credit for inspiring the growth
of the study of sociology as exemplified by the work of
Max Weber.
world.

Hegel's optimism can be beneficial in today's

Since the historian frequently operates in realm

where much of his material has an element of tragedy, an
acceptance of the Hegelian view may give him a sense of
purpose in his work.

But one need not accept Hegel's

philosophy in order to appreciate the depth of his thought.
When Hegel's ideas are applied to Vietnam, some
problems arise because of the passage of time.

Methods of

warfare have changed, political ideals are different, and
wars are now fought between nations over ideology rather

188

Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 216.
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than territory.

In addition one may use Hegel's philosophical

ambiguities to support whatever political viewpoint that
one holds.

But if Hegel's philosophy does not provide

concrete answers to problems in Vietnam, it can provide
insight and perspective.

History can be viewed as a

meaningful process even if one has to work very hard to
find the meaning.

The Vietnam War is a microcosm of

Hegel's dialectical process:

the dialectic sends forth

its roots and branches and causes subtle changes.

Then

at critical periods, such as the Geneva Conference or the
Gulf of Tonkin episode, the dialectic moves quickly to
establish a new order, a new movement to history.

The

spirit and determination of a people may also enable it
to overcome nations of greater material bulk and power.
Although Hegel did not discuss the spirit of nationalism,
it has been used in that context in this study.

In addition

Hegel has mentioned the importance of a great man to lead
a nation in time of conflict.

Ho Chi Minh provided a

symbol for his followers and did much to arouse the spirit
that lay within them.

A final application of Hegel's

philosophy would be to the lessons learned by other great
civilizations of the past.

If events prove to be

disadvantageous to a country, then its leaders should become
aware of the mistakes and correct them in order to avoid
the fate of other great civilizations.

The critical
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question to ask is whether America has learned from her
mistakes or whether she will follow the course of other
great empires.
Hegel's views on civil liberties also provides
insight for a democratic country.

If a country is strong

and secure, if its constitution is based on the spirit of
its people, then the government can overlook anomalies such
as war moratoriums and conscientious objectors.

If a

nation must resort to suppression, then it is not as
strong as it pretends.

"The owl of Minerva spreads its

wings only with the falling of dusk." 18 9

Wisdom leaves

when times grow dark.
The role of the individual is given much freedom
in Hegel's state.

Even though the individual finds his

rights and duties in the state, the state is an outgrowth
of history and popular will.

The great individual may

arise and lead his nation to great achievements.

Hegel

conceded that this was easier in a democracy than in the
other political forms; frequently the great individual
must resort to oratory and demagoguery in order to sway
the masses.
Though Hegel was not fond of democracies, he would
view the American democracy with favor because it is a

lB9Hegel, Philosophy bf Right, p. 13.
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practical nation, a nation of action.

He would not view the

combination of foreign policy and religious morality as good
however.

Morality cannot judge any nation as right or

wrong, only history can judge its successes or failures.
Perhaps in man's quest for perfection in America he can
learn from the mistakes of others.

The future cannot be

predicted for either Vietnam or America for Hegel did not
predict.

Spirit is still strong in America:

as long as the

people are conscious of reason, America will remain the
world historical nation.
There are several interpretations of history that a
historian may choose from when he writes.

He may decide

that history is chaos and that attempts to interpret it
any other way are unrealistic.

The historian may view

history as a series of cycles, of births and deaths as in
the seasons of nature.

The final choice is that history is

linear and is moving towards some purpose, or at least,
that there is some purpose to human life.

The linear

interpretation was the choice that Hegel made and the
choice that this author has made.

Regardless of the

interpretation that he chooses, the historian writes his
history as an act of faith.190

l90charles A. Beard, "Written History as An Act of
Faith,1' American Historical Review XXXVIII (January, 1934),
228-229.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
HEGEL
This essay will attempt to give reasons and support
for many of the positions arrived at in the body of the
paper.

Hegel's thought is complex and even contradictory

to many readers; for these reasons Hegel was misinterpreted in his own time and is still being misinterpreted
today.

To obtain the full flavor of Hegel's philosophy,

the serious student should read volumes that were published
over Hegel's lifetime, not just at the end of his life.
Nor should the reader choose excerpts here and there in a
certain work for he is likely to catch only one side of
Hegel's logic.

To understand Hegel the reader must be

as methodical and as comprehensive as Hegel was in writing
his philosophies:

the reader must relive with Hegel the

writing of each book.
The most important of Hegel's volumes to this study
is, of course, the Philosophy of History (1899; tr. J.
Sibree).

This is the most readable of all of Hegel's

mature works, but the reader should be warned that in
this volume Hegel is quite liberal with words such as
"Spirit", "Reason", "God", and is apt to be misled if
he does not have a basic understanding of what Hegel means
by these words.

The Philosophy of Right (1952; tr. T. M.
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Knox) presents Hegel's political philosophy, and must be
used by the reader to understand the role of the state in
world history.

In addition problems of internal dissension

are discussed--civil disobedience, freedom of the press,
patriotism.

The Phenomenology of Mind (1964; tr. J.B.

Baille) lays the groundwork for the ideas presented in
later philosophies.

This work develops the process of

the development of Spirit in the mind and to a larger
extent, in history.

Hegel devotes at least one third of

the Phenomenology to the French Revolution.
Of lesser importance to this study are Hegel's
On Christianity:
T. M. Knox).

Early Theological Writings (1961; tr.

This is a collection of Hegel's early essays

on Christianity.

They are well written and display none

of the abstractness of his later philosophical writings.
In recent times the Israeli government has had them investigated for traces of anti-semitism.

Richard Kroner's

introduction also supplied material for a discussion of
Hegel's logic.

The History of Philosophy (1963; tr. E. S.

Haldane and Frances Simson, 3 vols.) illustrates the
development of philosophy from ancient Oriental thinkers
to Hegel's own time.

It also shows that Regal did write

history.
For the general reader, two short biographies of
Hegel give insight'into his background and the period in
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which he lived.

Hegel:

An Illustrated Biography (1968;

tr. Joachim Neugroschel) by Franz Wiedman describes
Hegel's childhood, education, and later life, and in
addition, mentions the circumstances under which his
works were written.

Edward Caird's Hegel (1883) is

based on material provided by two of Hegel's students,
Rosenkranz and Haym.
Secondary sources interpreting Hegel have been
used sparingly.

Walter Kaufmann's Hegel (1965) has been

valuable because he has translated several essays not
previously published.

In addition he has translated

letters that Hegel wrote to friends during his lifetime.
Hegel's Political Philosophy (1970; ed. Walter Kaufmann)
presents ten essays by Hegelian experts on his political
philosophy.

Essays included in this volume are an

nintroduction" and !'The Hegel Myth and Its Method" by
Walter Kaufmann,

11

Hegel and Prussianism" and

11

Rebuttal"

by T. M. Knox, "Reply" and "Final Rejoinder 11 by E. F.
Carritt,

11

Hegel Rehabilitated 11 and

11

Hegel and His

Apologists" by Sidney Hook, "Hook's Hegel 11 and

11

Hegel and

Nationalism" by Shlomo Avineri, and "Hegeln by Z. A.
Pelezynski.

This series of debates enlightened many

obscure points in Hegel's philosophy.
Reason and Revolution:

Hegel and the Rise of

Social Theory (1960) by Herbert Marcuse provides some
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explanation of Hegelian ideas, but most important, it
illustrates how his philosophy was important in the
development of social theories--Marx in particular.
Gustav Mueller's "The Hegel Legend" Journal of the History
of Ideas, XIX (1958), 411-414, provided this author with
backing in the interpretation of Hegel's dialectic.
Mueller provides reasons why he thinks the dialectic has
been misused by many historians.

The connecting link

between Hegel's Philosophy of History and the Turner
hypothesis has been provided by W. Stull Holt in "Hegel,
The Turner Hypothesis, and the Safety-Value Theory, 11
Agricultural History, XXII (1948).
THE AMERICAN WORLD
The development of American foreign policy is a
volume in itself.

This author has attempted to generalize

trends in foreign policy, and so has relied on works which
emphasize the role of ideas in American problems.
A. Graebner's Ideas and Diplomacy:

Norman

Readings in the

Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy (1964)
attempts to summarize the growth of policy in terms of
trends.

These trends are illustrated by speeches and

other materials of public figures.

A second valuable

work in this realm is Ideas, Ideals and American Diplomacy

(1966) by Arthur A. Ehrich, Jr.

Ehrich's treatment is
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more limited than Graebner's, and he does not include
materials of public figures.
The 1954 Geneva Conference:

Indochina and Korea

(1968) is a collection of documents dealing with the
Geneva Accords.

These documents are valuable in that they

present the side that each negotiator wished to show to
critical opinion at home.

Since most of the negotiating

was done in private sessions, these documents illustrate
only the public stance that the negotiators took.
THE VIETNAM WORLD
For a brief history of Southeast Asia the reader
should consult Southeast Asia:
Milton W. Meyer.

A Brief History (1965) by

Meyer also attempts to relate geography

and economic and political conditions in the area.
F. Cady's Southeast Asia:

John

Its Historical Development

(1964) is a more extensive treatment of the history of
the region.

For a general treatment of the geography of

Vietnam the reader could consider Asia's Lands and Peoples

(1944) by George B. Cressey.
Denis Warner, an Australian correspondent in the
Vietnam War, has written The Last Confucian:
Southeast Asia, and the West (1964).

Vietnam,

Warner deals with

the problems of the South Vietnamese government after the
Geneva Accords, and does not attempt to interpret the actions
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of the North or of the Viet Cong.

Warner is highly

readable, and one can discern his distaste for the way
the war was being carried on by the South Vietnamese.
For an account of the life of the premier Vietnamese
figure in the conflict, one should consult Jean LaCouture's
Ho Chi Minh:

A Political Biography (1968).

LaCouture,

a Frenchman with many years experience in Vietnam,
attempts to give a North Vietnamese point of view.

He

has much sympathy with Ho and his movement.
The Vietnam Reader (1967) by Marcus Raskin and
Bernard Fall provides a collection of speeches, diaries,
and thoughts on Vietnam.

There are selections from

speeches by Americans such as Dean Acheson and George
Kennan, but more important are selections from captured
Viet Cong diaries.

Most are not of high military value,

but they give some indication of the Viet Cong philosophy.
Joseph Buttinger, an American foreign policy expert, sums
up Vietnamese history in a very interesting and readable
volume, Vietnam:

A Political History (1968).

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AMERICA AND NORTH VIETNAM
There are a large number of books about the
Vietnam war.

One must be selective for one can waste

time by consulting everything on the library shelf.

In

addition they are repetitious, particularly in the early

137
phases of the war.

There is generally a lack of primary

documents dealing with the war.

One of the most valuable

works consulted in relation to America's involvement in
Vietnam was Chester L. Cooper's The Lost Crusade:
in Vietnam (1970).

America

Cooper was a member of the delegation

to the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, the 1954
Conference in Manila which established SEATO, the 19611962 Geneva Conference on Laos, and the 1966 Conference
in Manila.

In addition Cooper was an assistant for

Asian affairs in the Johnson Administration.

Cooper

provides documentation of America's involvement in Vietnam
from the beginning of WW II to July of 1970.
A scholarly approach is taken by Robert Randle in
Geneva 1954:

The Settlement of the Indochina War (1969).

This extensive volume, 618 pages, is particularly valuable
for its extensive bibliography.

In addition Randle puts

the diplomacy of the Geneva Accords in a perspective
that is difficult to obtain with documents alone.
LaCouture's Vietnam:

Jean

Between Two Truces (1966) is a

modern history of the country with emphasis on the problems
since the Geneva Accords.

LaCouture's sympathy with the

north is evident throughout the work.
A particularly valuable source of statements and
public policies on Vietnam from 1950 to 1965 is the Senate's
Committee on Foreign Relations Background Information
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Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (1966).

One could

only wish that a similar document be published for the
period since 1965.

John McAlister's Vietnam:

of Revolution (1969) should be consulted.

The Origins

McAlister does

not believe that revolution is complete in South Vietnam
because the political power has not filtered down to the
people.
Richard Rovere has written Waist Deep in the Big
Muddy:

Personal Reflections (1967).

This is an enter-

taining volume, not meant to be inclusive, in which
Rovere gives his views on the war in Vietnam.
has also written

11

Reflections:

Rovere

Half Out of Our Tree"

New Yorker (October 28, 1967), 60-98.

Rovere questions

whether America has the right to be involved in any kind
of war in Asia.

Two sources which give some insight

into what the North Vietnamese feel are provided by
Ho Chi Minh on Revolution:

Selected Writings (1967),

ed. Bernard Fall and "How Hanoi Sees the War" The Reporter
(August 1967), 17-20, by Denis Warner.

Fall's collection

of speeches and writings of Ho Chi Minh will give the
western reader some of the feeling of determination that
seems to permeate the thought of North Vietnamese leaders.
Duong Van Minh, a South Vietnamese, provides
reasons why his country has not been able to stabilize
itself even with American aid in

11

A Question of Confidence1r
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Foreign Affairs XLVII, (October 1968), 84-91,

LaCouture

discusses what he thinks was the extension of the Vietnam
War into the Indochina War when Nixon ordered troops into
Cambodia and Laos in "From the Vietnam War to An Indochina
War" Foreign Affairs XLVIII (July 1970), 617-628.
The material for the period since 1966 is not
extensive.

The State Department issues copies of speeches

by officials such as Johnson, Rostow, Nixon, and Bundy.
These are attempts by officials to justify foreign policy
positions that they have taken.

Sometimes these statements

announced new policies to be followed.

Two sources of

lesser value are the State Department Legal Defense Brief

(1969) prepared by Leonard C. Meeker and William
Henderson's "South Vietnam Finds Itself" Foreign Affairs
XXXV (1956-1957), 283-294,

Meeker attempts to put the

American position in Vietnam on legal grounds but ends
up justifying intervention by interpretation.

Henderson's

assessment of Diem as a leader in 1956 is interesting
because of the hindsight that one has in 1971.

The New

York Times has proved to be a valuable source of information, particularly in the later stages of the war where
material is confined to speeches and public pronouncements.
Other materials that the reader might consult for
background information are Vietnam and American Foreign
Policy (1968), ed. John R. Boettinger, and the U.S. Army
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Area Handbook (1962) by George L. Harris and others.

This

latter volume provides sociological, economic, political,
and military background materials for Vietnam.

The Vietnam

Hearings (1966) gives policy statements by James Gavin,
George Kennan, Dean Rusk, and Maxwell Taylor.

In addition

there are numerous speeches and policy statements issued
by government officials have proved to be valuable.

These

statements are usually published by the State Department.

